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Abstract. Reduction to the satisfiability problem for constrained Horn
clauses (CHCs) is a widely studied approach to automated program veri-
fication. The current CHC-based methods for pointer-manipulating pro-
grams, however, are not very scalable. This paper proposes a novel trans-
lation of pointer-manipulating Rust programs into CHCs, which clears
away pointers and memories by leveraging ownership. We formalize the
translation for a simplified core of Rust and prove its correctness. We
have implemented a prototype verifier for a subset of Rust and confirmed
the effectiveness of our method.
1 Introduction
Reduction to constrained Horn clauses (CHCs) is a widely studied approach to
automated program verification [22,6]. A CHC is a Horn clause [30] equipped
with constraints, namely a formula of the form ϕ ⇐= ψ0 ∧ · · · ∧ ψk−1, where ϕ
and ψ0, . . . , ψk−1 are either an atomic formula of the form f(t0, . . . , tn−1) (f is
a predicate variable and t0, . . . , tn−1 are terms), or a constraint (e.g. a < b+ 1).1
We call a finite set of CHCs a CHC system or sometimes just CHC. CHC solving
is an act of deciding whether a given CHC system S has a model, i.e. a valuation
for predicate variables that makes all the CHCs in S valid. A variety of program
verification problems can be naturally reduced to CHC solving.
For example, let us consider the following C code that defines McCarthy’s
91 function.
int mc91(int n) {
if (n > 100) return n - 10; else return mc91(mc91(n + 11));
}
Suppose that we wish to prove mc91(n) returns 91 whenever n ≤ 101 (if it ter-
minates). The wished property is equivalent to the satisfiability of the following
CHCs, where Mc91 (n, r) means that mc91(n) returns r if it terminates.
Mc91 (n, r) ⇐= n > 100 ∧ r = n− 10
? This paper is the full version of [47].
1 Free variables are universally quantified. Terms and variables are governed under
sorts (e.g. int, bool), which are made explicit in the formalization of § 3.
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Mc91 (n, r) ⇐= n ≤ 100 ∧ Mc91 (n+ 11, r′) ∧ Mc91 (r′, r)
r = 91 ⇐= n ≤ 101 ∧ Mc91 (n, r)
The property can be verified because this CHC system has a model:
Mc91 (n, r) :⇐⇒ r = 91 ∨ (n > 100 ∧ r = n− 10).
A CHC solver provides a common infrastructure for a variety of programming
languages and properties to be verified. There have been effective CHC solvers
[40,18,29,12] that can solve instances obtained from actual programs2 and many
program verification tools [23,37,25,28,38,60] use a CHC solver as a backend.
However, the current CHC-based methods do not scale very well for programs
using pointers, as we see in § 1.1. We propose a novel method to tackle this
problem for pointer-manipulating programs under Rust-style ownership, as we
explain in § 1.2.
1.1 Challenges in Verifying Pointer-Manipulating Programs
The standard CHC-based approach [23] for pointer-manipulating programs rep-
resents the memory state as an array, which is passed around as an argument
of each predicate (cf. the store-passing style), and a pointer as an index.
For example, a pointer-manipulating variation of the previous program
void mc91p(int n, int* r) {
if (n > 100) *r = n - 10;
else { int s; mc91p(n + 11, &s); mc91p(s, r); }
}
is translated into the following CHCs by the array-based approach:3
Mc91p(n, r, h, h′) ⇐= n > 100 ∧ h′ = h{r ← n− 10}
Mc91p(n, r, h, h′) ⇐= n ≤ 100 ∧ Mc91p(n+ 11,ms, h, h′′)
∧ Mc91p(h′′[ms], r, h′′, h′)
h′[r] = 91 ⇐= n ≤ 101 ∧ Mc91p(n, r, h, h′).
Mc91p additionally takes two arrays h, h ′ representing the (heap) memory states
before/after the call of mc91p. The second argument r of Mc91p, which corre-
sponds to the pointer argument r in the original program, is an index for the
arrays. Hence, the assignment *r = n - 10 is modeled in the first CHC as an
update of the r-th element of the array. ms represents the address of s. This
CHC system has a model
Mc91p(n, r, h, h′) :⇐⇒ h′[r] = 91 ∨ (n > 100 ∧ h′[r] = n− 10),
which can be found by some array-supporting CHC solvers including Spacer [40],
thanks to evolving SMT-solving techniques for arrays [62,10].
2 For example, the above CHC system on Mc91 can be solved instantly by many CHC
solvers including Spacer [40] and HoIce [12].
3 h{r ← v} is the array made from h by replacing the value at index r with v. h[r] is
the value of array h at index r.
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However, the array-based approach has some shortcomings. Let us consider,
for example, the following innocent-looking code.4
bool just_rec(int* ma) {
if (rand() >= 0) return true;
int old_a = *ma; int b = rand(); just_rec(&b);
return (old_a == *ma);
}
It can immediately return true; or it recursively calls itself and checks if the
target of ma remains unchanged through the recursive call. In effect this function
does nothing on the allocated memory blocks, although it can possibly modify
some of the unused parts of the memory.
Suppose we wish to verify that just_rec never returns false. The standard
CHC-based verifier for C, SeaHorn [23], generates a CHC system like below:56
JustRec(ma, h, h′, r) ⇐= h′ = h ∧ r = true
JustRec(ma, h, h′, r) ⇐= mb 6= ma ∧ h′′ = h{mb ← b}
∧ JustRec(mb, h′′, h′, ) ∧ r = (h[ma] == h′[ma])
r = true ⇐= JustRec(ma, h, h′, r)
Unfortunately the CHC system above is not satisfiable and thus SeaHorn issues
a false alarm. This is because, in this formulation, mb may not necessarily be
completely fresh; it is assumed to be different from the argument ma of the
current call, but may coincide with ma of some deep ancestor calls.7
The simplest remedy would be to explicitly specify the way of memory allo-
cation. For example, one can represent the memory state as a pair of an array h
and an index sp indicating the maximum index that has been allocated so far.
JustRec+(ma, h, sp, h
′, sp′, r) ⇐= h′ = h ∧ sp′ = sp ∧ r = true
JustRec+(ma, h, sp, h
′, sp′, r) ⇐= mb = sp′′ = sp + 1 ∧ h′′ = h{mb ← b}
JustRec+(mb, h
′′, sp′′, h′, sp′, ) ∧ r = (h[ma] == h′[ma])
r = true ⇐= JustRec+(ma, h, sp, h′, sp′, r) ∧ ma ≤ sp
The resulting CHC system now has a model, but it involves quantifiers:
JustRec+(ma, h, sp, h
′, sp′, r) :⇐⇒ r = true ∧ ma ≤ sp ∧ sp ≤ sp′
∧ ∀ i ≤ sp. h[i] = h′[i]
Finding quantified invariants is known to be difficult in general despite ac-
tive studies on it [41,2,36,26,19] and most current array-supporting CHC solvers
give up finding quantified invariants. In general, much more complex operations
on pointers can naturally take place, which makes the universally quantified in-
variants highly involved and hard to automatically find. To avoid complexity of
models, CHC-based verification tools [23,24,37] tackle pointers by pointer anal-
4 rand() is a non-deterministic function that can return any integer value.
5 ==, !=, >=,&& denote binary operations that return boolean values.
6 We omitted the allocation for old_a for simplicity.
7 Precisely speaking, SeaHorn tends to even omit shallow address-freshness checks like
mb 6= ma.
4 Y. Matsushita et al.
ysis [61,43]. Although it does have some effects, the current applicable scope of
pointer analysis is quite limited.
1.2 Our Approach: Leverage Rust’s Ownership System
This paper proposes a novel approach to CHC-based verification of pointer-
manipulating programs, which makes use of ownership information to avoid an
explicit representation of the memory.
Rust-style Ownership. Various styles of ownership/permission/capability have
been introduced to control and reason about usage of pointers on programming
language design, program analysis and verification [13,31,8,9,7,64,63]. In what
follows, we focus on the ownership in the style of the Rust programming language
[46,55].
Roughly speaking, the ownership system guarantees that, for each memory
cell and at each point of program execution, either (i) only one alias has the
update (write & read) permission to the cell, with any other alias having no
permission to it, or (ii) some (or no) aliases have the read permission to the cell,
with no alias having the update permission to it. In summary, when an alias
can read some data (with an update/read permission), any other alias cannot
modify the data.
As a running example, let us consider the program below, which follows
Rust’s ownership discipline (it is written in the C style; the Rust version is
presented at Example 1):
int* take_max(int* ma, int* mb) {
if (*ma >= *mb) return ma; else return mb;
}
bool inc_max(int a, int b) {
{
int* mc = take_max(&a, &b); // borrow a and b
*mc += 1;
} // end of borrow
return (a != b);
}
Figure 1 illustrates which alias has the update permission to the contents of a
and b during the execution of take_max(5,3).
A notable feature is borrow. In the running example, when the pointers &a
and &b are taken for take_max, the update permissions of a and b are temporarily
transferred to the pointers. The original variables, a and b, lose the ability to
access their contents until the end of borrow. The function take_max returns a
pointer having the update permission until the end of borrow, which justifies the
update operation *mc += 1. In this example, the end of borrow is at the end of
the inner block of inc_max. At this point, the permissions are given back to the
original variables a and b, allowing to compute a != b. Note that mc can point
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Fig. 1. Values and aliases of a and b in evaluating inc_max(5,3). Each line shows
each variable’s permission timeline: a solid line expresses the update permission and a
bullet shows a point when the borrowed permission is given back. For example, b has
the update permission to its content during (i) and (iv), but not during (ii) and (iii)
because the pointer mb, created at the call of take_max, borrows b until the end of (iii).
to a and also to b and that this choice is determined dynamically. The values of
a and b after the borrow depend on the behavior of the pointer mc.
The end of each borrow is statically managed by a lifetime. See §2 for a more
precise explanation of ownership, borrow and lifetimes.
Key Idea. The key idea of our method is to represent a pointer ma as a pair 〈a, a◦〉
of the current target value a and the target value a◦ at the end of borrow.89 This
representation employs access to the future information (it is related to prophecy
variables; see § 5). This simple idea turns out to be very powerful.
In our approach, the verification problem “Does inc_max always return true?”
is reduced to the satisfiability of the following CHCs:
TakeMax (〈a, a◦〉, 〈b, b◦〉, r) ⇐= a ≥ b ∧ b◦ = b ∧ r = 〈a, a◦〉
TakeMax (〈a, a◦〉, 〈b, b◦〉, r) ⇐= a < b ∧ a◦ = a ∧ r = 〈b, b◦〉
IncMax (a, b, r) ⇐= TakeMax (〈a, a◦〉, 〈b, b◦〉, 〈c, c◦〉) ∧ c′ = c+ 1
∧ c◦ = c′ ∧ r = (a◦ != b◦)
r = true ⇐= IncMax (a, b, r).
The mutable reference ma is now represented as 〈a, a◦〉, and similarly for mb and
mc. The first CHC models the then-clause of take_max: the return value is ma,
which is expressed as r = 〈a, a◦〉; in contrast, mb is released, which constrains
b◦, the value of b at the end of borrow, to the current value b. In the clause on
IncMax , mc is represented as a pair 〈c, c◦〉. The constraint c′ = c+ 1 ∧ c◦ = c′
models the increment of mc (in the phase (iii) in Fig. 1). Importantly, the final
check a != b is simply expressed as a◦ != b◦; the updated values of a/b are
available as a◦/b◦. Clearly, the CHC system above has a simple model.
8 Precisely, this is the representation of a pointer with a borrowed update permission
(i.e. mutable reference). Other cases are discussed in § 3.
9 For example, in the case of Fig. 1, when take_max is called, the pointer ma is 〈5, 6〉
and mb is 〈3, 3〉.
6 Y. Matsushita et al.
Also, the just_rec example in § 1.1 can be encoded as a CHC system
JustRec(〈a, a◦〉, r) ⇐= a◦ = a ∧ r = true
JustRec(〈a, a◦〉, r) ⇐= mb = 〈b, b◦〉 ∧ JustRec(mb, )
∧ a◦ = a ∧ r = (a== a◦)
r = true ⇐= JustRec(〈a, a◦〉, r).
Now it has a very simple model: JustRec(ma, r) :⇐⇒ r = true. Remarkably,
arrays and quantified formulas are not required to express the model, which
allows the CHC system to be easily solved by many CHC solvers. More advanced
examples are presented in § 3.4, including one with destructive update on a
singly-linked list.
Contributions. Based on the above idea, we formalize the translation from pro-
grams to CHC systems for a core language of Rust, prove correctness (both
soundness and completeness) of the translation, and confirm the effectiveness
of our approach through preliminary experiments. The core language supports,
among others, recursive types. Remarkably, our approach enables us to automat-
ically verify some properties of a program with destructive updates on recursive
data types such as lists and trees.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In §2, we provide a formalized
core language of Rust supporting recursions, lifetime-based ownership and recur-
sive types. In §3, we formalize our translation from programs to CHCs and prove
its correctness. In § 4, we report on the implementation and the experimental
results. In § 5 we discuss related work and in § 6 we conclude the paper.
2 Core Language: Calculus of Ownership and Reference
We formalize a core of Rust as Calculus of Ownership and Reference (COR),
whose design has been affected by the safe layer of λRust in the RustBelt paper
[32]. It is a typed procedural language with a Rust-like ownership system.
2.1 Syntax
The following is the syntax of COR.
(program) Π ::= F0 · · · Fn−1
(function definition) F ::= fn f Σ {L0:S0 · · · Ln−1:Sn−1}
(function signature) Σ ::= 〈α0, . . . , αm−1 | αa0≤αb0 , . . . , αal−1≤αbl−1〉
(x0:T0, . . . , xn−1:Tn−1)→ U
(statement) S ::= I; gotoL | returnx
| match ∗x {inj0∗y0→gotoL0, inj1∗y1→gotoL1}
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(instruction) I ::= let y = mutborα x | dropx | immutx | swap(∗x, ∗y)
| let ∗y = x | let y = ∗x | let ∗y = copy ∗x | x as T
| let y = f〈α0, . . . , αm−1〉(x0, . . . , xn−1)
| introα | nowα | α ≤ β
| let ∗y = const | let ∗y = ∗x op ∗x′ | let ∗y = rand()
| let ∗y = injT0+T1i ∗x | let ∗y = (∗x0, ∗x1) | let (∗y0, ∗y1) = ∗x
(type) T,U ::= X | µX.T | P T | T0+T1 | T0×T1 | int | unit
(pointer kind) P ::= own | Rα (reference kind) R ::= mut | immut
α, β, γ ::= (lifetime variable) X,Y ::= (type variable)
x, y ::= (variable) f, g ::= (function name) L ::= (label)
const ::= n | () bool := unit + unit op ::= op int | opbool
op int ::= + | − | · · · opbool ::= >= | == | != | · · ·
Program, Function and Label. A program (denoted by Π) is a set of function
definitions. A function definition (F ) consists of a function name, a function
signature and a set of labeled statements (L:S). In COR, for simplicity, the
input/output types of a function are restricted to pointer types. A function is
parametrized over lifetime parameters under constraints; polymorphism on types
is not supported for simplicity, just as λRust. For the lifetime parameter receiver,
often 〈α0, · · · |〉 is abbreviated to 〈α0, . . .〉 and 〈|〉 is omitted.
A label (L) is an abstract program point to be jumped to by goto.10 Each
label is assigned a whole context by the type system, as we see later. This style,
with unstructured control flows, helps the formal description of CHCs in §3.2. A
function should have the label entry (entry point), and every label in a function
should be syntactically reachable from entry by goto jumps.11
Statement and Instruction. A statement (S) performs an instruction with a jump
(I; gotoL), returns from a function (returnx), or branches (match ∗x {· · ·}).
An instruction (I) performs an elementary operation: mutable (re)borrow
(let y = mutborα x), releasing a variable (dropx), weakening ownership (immut
x),12 swap (swap(∗x, ∗y)), creating/dereferencing a pointer (let ∗y = x, let y =
∗x), copy (let ∗y = copy ∗x),13 type weakening (x as T ), function call (let y =
f〈· · ·〉(· · ·)), lifetime-related ghost operations (introα, nowα, α ≤ β; explained
later), getting a constant / operation result / random integer (let ∗y = const /
∗xop∗x′ / rand()), creating a variant (let ∗y = injT0+T1i ∗x), and creating/destruct-
ing a pair (let ∗y = (∗x0, ∗x1), let (∗y0, ∗y1) = ∗x). An instruction of form
let ∗y = · · · implicitly allocates new memory cells as y; also, some instruc-
tions deallocate memory cells implicitly. For simplicity, every variable is de-
10 It is related to a continuation introduced by letcont in λRust.
11 Here ‘syntactically’ means that detailed information such that a branch condition
on match or non-termination is ignored.
12 This instruction turns a mutable reference to an immutable reference. Using this, an
immutable borrow from x to y can be expressed by let y = mutborα x; immut y.
13 Copying a pointer (an immutable reference) x to y can be expressed by let ∗ox =
x; let ∗oy = copy ∗ox ; let y = ∗oy.
8 Y. Matsushita et al.
signed to be a pointer and every release of a variable should be explicitly an-
notated by ‘dropx’. In addition, we provide swap instead of assignment; the
usual assignment (of copyable data from ∗x to ∗y) can be expressed by let ∗x′ =
copy ∗x; swap(∗y, ∗x′); dropx′.
Type. As a type (T ), we support recursive types (µX.T ), pointer types (P T ),
variant types (T0 + T1), pair types (T0 × T1) and basic types (int, unit).
A pointer type P T can be an owning pointer ownT (Box<T> in Rust), muta-
ble reference mutα T (&'a mut T) or immutable reference immutα T (&'a T). An
owning pointer has data in the heap memory, can freely update the data (un-
less it is borrowed), and has the obligation to clean up the data from the heap
memory. In contrast, a mutable/immutable reference (or unique/shared refer-
ence) borrows an update/read permission from an owning pointer or another
reference with the deadline of a lifetime α (introduced later). A mutable ref-
erence cannot be copied, while an immutable reference can be freely copied. A
reference loses the permission at the time when it is released.14
A type T that appears in a program (not just as a substructure of some type)
should satisfy the following condition (if it holds we say the type is complete):
every type variable X in T is bound by some µ and guarded by a pointer con-
structor (i.e. given a binding of form µX.U , every occurrence of X in U is a part
of a pointer type, of form P U ′).
Lifetime. A lifetime is an abstract time point in the process of computation,15
which is statically managed by lifetime variables α. A lifetime variable can be a
lifetime parameter that a function takes or a local lifetime variable introduced
within a function. We have three lifetime-related ghost instructions: introα in-
troduces a new local lifetime variable, nowα sets a local lifetime variable to
the current moment and eliminates it, and α ≤ β asserts the ordering on local
lifetime variables.
Expressivity and Limitations. COR can express most borrow patterns in the
core of Rust. The set of moments when a borrow is active forms a continuous
time range, even under non-lexical lifetimes [54].16
A major limitation of COR is that it does not support unsafe code blocks and
also lacks type traits and closures. Still, our idea can be combined with unsafe
code and closures, as discussed in §3.5. Another limitation of COR is that, unlike
14 In Rust, even after a reference loses the permission and the lifetime ends, its address
data can linger in the memory, although dereferencing on the reference is no longer
allowed. We simplify the behavior of lifetimes in COR.
15 In the terminology of Rust, a lifetime often means a time range where a borrow is
active. To simplify the discussions, however, we in this paper use the term lifetime
to refer to a time point when a borrow ends.
16 Strictly speaking, this property is broken by recently adopted implicit two-phase
borrows [59,53]. However, by shallow syntactical reordering, a program with implicit
two-phase borrows can be fit into usual borrow patterns.
RustHorn: CHC-based Verification for Rust Programs (full version) 9
Rust and λRust, we cannot directly modify/borrow a fragment of a variable (e.g.
an element of a pair). Still, we can eventually modify/borrow a fragment by
borrowing the whole variable and splitting pointers (e.g. ‘let (∗y0, ∗y1) = ∗x’).
This borrow-and-split strategy, nevertheless, yields a subtle obstacle when we
extend the calculus for advanced data types (e.g. get_default in ‘Problem Case
#3’ from [54]). For future work, we pursue a more expressive calculus modeling
Rust and extend our verification method to it.
Example 1 (COR Program). The following program expresses the functions take_max
and inc_max presented in §1.2. We shorthand sequential executions by ‘;L’ (e.g.
L0: I0;
L1 I1; gotoL2 stands for L0: I0; gotoL1 L1: I1; gotoL2).
17
fn take-max 〈α〉 (ma:mutα int, mb:mutα int)→ mutα int {
entry: let ∗ord = ∗ma >= ∗mb;L1 match ∗ord {inj1 ∗ou → goto L2, inj0 ∗ou → goto L5}
L2: drop ou;L3 dropmb;L4 returnma L5: drop ou;L6 dropma;L7 returnmb
}
fn inc-max(oa: own int, ob: own int)→ own bool {
entry: introα;L1 letma = mutborα oa;
L2 letmb = mutborα ob;
L3
letmc = take-max〈α〉(ma,mb);L4 let ∗o1 = 1;L5 let ∗oc′ = ∗mc + ∗o1 ;L6 drop o1 ;L7
swap(mc, oc′);L8 drop oc′;L9 dropmc;L10 nowα;L11 let ∗or = ∗oa != ∗ob;L12
drop oa;L13 drop ob;L14 return or
}
In take-max, conditional branching is performed by match and its goto directions
(at L1). In inc-max, increment on the mutable reference mc is performed by
calculating the new value (at L4, L5) and updating the data by swap (at L7).
The following is the corresponding Rust program, with ghost annotations
(marked italic and dark green, e.g. drop ma ) on lifetimes and releases of mutable
references.
fn take_max<'a>(ma: &'a mut i32, mb: &'a mut i32) -> &'a mut i32 {
if *ma >= *mb { drop mb; ma } else { drop ma; mb }
}
fn inc_max(mut a: i32, mut b: i32) -> bool {
{ intro 'a;
let mc = take_max<'a> (&'a mut a, &'a mut b); *mc += 1;
drop mc; now 'a; }
a != b
}
2.2 Type System
The type system of COR assigns to each label a whole context (Γ,A). We define
below the whole context and the typing judgments.
17 The first character of each variable indicates the pointer kind (o/m corresponds to
own/mutα). We swap the branches of the match statement in take-max, to fit the
order to C/Rust’s if.
10 Y. Matsushita et al.
Context. A variable context Γ is a finite set of items of form x:a T , where T
should be a complete pointer type and a (which we call activeness) is of form
‘active’ or ‘†α’ (frozen until lifetime α). We abbreviate x:active T as x:T . A
variable context should not contain two items on the same variable. A lifetime
context A = (A,R) is a finite preordered set of lifetime variables, where A is the
underlying set and R is the preorder. We write |A| and ≤A to refer to A and R.
Finally, a whole context (Γ,A) is a pair of a variable context Γ and a lifetime
context A such that every lifetime variable in Γ is contained in A.
Notations. The set operation A + B (or more generally
∑
λAλ) denotes the
disjoint union, i.e. the union defined only if the arguments are disjoint. The set
operation A−B denotes the set difference defined only if A ⊇ B. For a natural
number n, [n] denotes the set {0, . . . , n−1}.
Generally, an auxiliary definition for a rule can be presented just below,
possibly in a dotted box.
Program and Function. The rules for typing programs and functions are pre-
sented below. They assign to each label a whole context (Γ,A). ‘S:Π,f (Γ,A) |
(ΓL,AL)L | U ’ is explained later.
for anyF inΠ, F :Π (Γname(F ),L,Aname(F ),L)L∈LabelF
Π: (Γf,L,Af,L)(f,L)∈FnLabelΠ
name(F ): the function name of F LabelF : the set of labels in F
FnLabelΠ : the set of pairs (f, L) such that a function f in Π has a label L
F = fn f〈α0, . . . , αm−1 |αa0≤αb0 , . . . , αal−1≤αbl−1〉(x0:T0, . . . , xn−1:Tn−1)→U {· · ·}
Γentry = {xi:Ti | i∈ [n]} A = {αj |j∈ [m]} Aentry =
(
A,
(
IdA∪{(αak , αbk ) |k∈ [l]}
)+)
for any L′:S ∈ LabelStmtF , S:Π,f (ΓL′ ,AL′) | (ΓL,AL)L∈LabelF | U
F :Π (ΓL,AL)L∈LabelF
LabelStmtF : the set of labeled statements in F
IdA: the identity relation on A R
+: the transitive closure of R
On the rule for the function, the initial whole context at entry is specified
(the second and third preconditions) and also the contexts for other labels are
checked (the fourth precondition). The context for each label (in each function)
can actually be determined in the order by the distance in the number of goto
jumps from entry, but that order is not very obvious because of unstructured
control flows.
Statement. ‘S:Π,f (Γ,A) | (ΓL,AL)L | U ’ means that running the statement S
(under Π, f) with the whole context (Γ,A) results in a jump to a label with the
whole contexts specified by (ΓL,AL)L or a return of data of type U . Its rules
are presented below. ‘I:Π,f (Γ,A)→ (Γ′,A′)’ is explained later.
I:Π,f (Γ,A)→ (ΓL0 ,AL0)
I; gotoL0:Π,f (Γ,A) | (ΓL,AL)L | U
Γ = {x:U} |A| = AexΠ,f
returnx:Π,f (Γ,A) | (ΓL,AL)L | U
AexΠ,f : the set of lifetime parameters of f in Π
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x:P (T0+T1) ∈ Γ
for i = 0, 1, (ΓLi ,ALi) = (Γ−{x:P (T0+T1)}+{yi:P Ti}, A)
match ∗x {inj0 ∗y0 → gotoL0, inj1 ∗y1 → gotoL1}:Π,f (Γ,A) | (ΓL,AL)L | U
The rule for the return statement ensures that there remain no extra variables
and local lifetime variables.
Instruction. ‘I:Π,f (Γ,A)→ (Γ′,A′)’ means that running the instruction I (un-
der Π, f) updates the whole context (Γ,A) into (Γ′,A′). The rules are designed
so that, for any I, Π, f , (Γ,A), there exists at most one (Γ′,A′) such that
I:Π,f (Γ,A)→ (Γ′,A′) holds. Below we present some of the rules; the complete
rules are presented in Appendix A.1. The following is the typing rule for mutable
(re)borrow.
α /∈ AexΠ,f P = own,mutβ for any γ ∈ LifetimeP T , α ≤A γ
let y = mutborα x :Π,f (Γ+{x:P T}, A)→ (Γ+{y:mutα T, x:†α P T}, A)
LifetimeT : the set of lifetime variables occurring in T
After you mutably (re)borrow an owning pointer / mutable reference x until α, x
is frozen until α. Here, α should be a local lifetime variable18 (the first precondi-
tion) that does not live longer than the data of x (the third precondition). Below
are the typing rules for local lifetime variable introduction and elimination.
introα :Π,f
(
Γ, (A,R)
)→ (Γ, ({α}+A, {α}×({α}+AexΠ,f )+R))
α /∈ AexΠ,f
nowα :Π,f
(
Γ, ({α}+A, R))→ ({thawα(x:a T ) | x:a T ∈Γ}, (A, {(β, γ)∈R | β 6=α}))
thawα(x:
a T ) :=
{
x:T (a = †α)
x:a T (otherwise)
On introα, it just ensures the new local lifetime variable to be earlier than
any lifetime parameters (which are given by exterior functions). On nowα, the
variables frozen with α get active again. Below is the typing rule for dereference
of a pointer to a pointer, which may be a bit interesting.
let y = ∗x :Π,f (Γ+{x:P P ′ T}, A)→ (Γ+{y: (P ◦P ′)T}, A)
P ◦ own = own ◦ P := P Rα ◦R′β := R′′α where R′′ =
{
mut (R = R′ = mut)
immut (otherwise)
The third precondition of the typing rule for mutbor justifies taking just α in
the rule ‘Rα ◦R′β := R′′α’.
Let us interpret Π: (Γf,L,Af,L)(f,L)∈FnLabelΠ as “the program Π has the
type (Γf,L,Af,L)(f,L)∈FnLabelΠ”. The type system ensures that any program
has at most one type (which may be a bit unclear because of unstructured
control flows). Hereinafter, we implicitly assume that a program has a type.
18 In COR, a reference that lives after the return from the function should be cre-
ated by splitting a reference (e.g. ‘let (∗y0, ∗y1) = ∗x’) given in the inputs; see also
Expressivity and Limitations.
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2.3 Concrete Operational Semantics
We introduce for COR concrete operational semantics, which handles a concrete
model of the heap memory.
The basic item, concrete configuration C, is defined as follows.
S ::= end
∣∣ [f, L]x,F; S (concrete configuration) C ::= [f, L] F; S | H
Here, H is a heap, which maps addresses (represented by integers) to integers
(data). F is a concrete stack frame, which maps variables to addresses. The stack
part of C is of form ‘[f, L] F; [f ′, L′]x,F′; · · · ; end’ (we may omit the terminator
‘; end’). [f, L] on each stack frame indicates the program point. ‘x,’ on each non-
top stack frame is the receiver of the value returned by the function call.
Concrete operational semantics is characterized by the one-step transition
relation C →Π C′ and the termination relation finalΠ(C), which can be de-
fined straightforwardly. Below we show the rules for mutable (re)borrow, swap,
function call and return from a function; the complete rules and an example
execution are presented in Appendix A.2. SΠ,f,L is the statement for the label
L of the function f in Π. TyΠ,f,L(x) is the type of variable x at the label.
SΠ,f,L = let y = mutborα x; gotoL
′ F(x) = a
[f, L] F; S | H →Π [f, L′] F+{(y, a)}; S | H
SΠ,f,L = swap(∗x, ∗y); gotoL′ TyΠ,f,L(x) = P T F(x) = a F(y) = b
[f, L] F; S | H+{(a+k,mk) |k∈ [#T ]}+{(b+k, nk) |k∈ [#T ]}
→Π [f, L′] F; S | H+{(a+k, nk) |k∈ [#T ]}+{(b+k,mk) |k∈ [#T ]}
SΠ,f,L = let y = g〈· · ·〉(x0, . . . , xn−1); gotoL′
ΣΠ,g = 〈· · ·〉(x′0:T0, . . . , x′n−1:Tn−1)→ U
[f, L] F+{(xi, ai) | i∈ [n]}; S | H→Π [g, entry] {(x′i, ai) | i∈ [n]}; [f, L] y,F; S | H
SΠ,f,L = returnx
[f, L] {(x, a)}; [g, L′]x′,F′; S | H→Π [g, L′] F′+{(x′, a)}; S | H
SΠ,f,L = returnx
finalΠ
(
[f, L] {(x, a)} | H)
Here we introduce ‘#T ’, which represents how many memory cells the type T
takes (at the outermost level). #T is defined for every complete type T , because
every occurrence of type variables in a complete type is guarded by a pointer
constructor.
#(T0+T1) := 1 + max{#T0,#T1} #(T0×T1) := #T0 + #T1
#µX.T := #T [µX.T/X] # int = #P T := 1 # unit = 0
3 CHC Representation of COR Programs
To formalize the idea discussed in §1, we give a translation from COR programs
to CHC systems, which precisely characterize the input-output relations of the
COR programs. We first define the logic for CHCs (§ 3.1). We then formally
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describe our translation (§3.2) and prove its correctness (§3.3). Also, we examine
effectiveness of our approach with advanced examples (§ 3.4) and discuss how
our idea can be extended and enhanced (§ 3.5).
3.1 Multi-sorted Logic for Describing CHCs
To begin with, we introduce a first-order multi-sorted logic for describing the
CHC representation of COR programs.
Syntax. The syntax is defined as follows.
(CHC) Φ ::= ∀x0:σ0, . . . , xm−1:σm−1. ϕˇ ⇐= ψ0 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn−1
> := the nullary conjunction of formulas
(formula) ϕ,ψ ::= f(t0, . . . , tn−1) (elementary formula) ϕˇ ::= f(p0, . . . , pn−1)
(term) t ::= x | 〈t〉 | 〈t∗, t◦〉 | inji t | (t0, t1) | ∗t | ◦t | t.i | const | t op t′
(value) v, w ::= 〈v〉 | 〈v∗, v◦〉 | inji v | (v0, v1) | const
(pattern) p, q ::= x | 〈p〉 | 〈p∗, p◦〉 | inji p | (p0, p1) | const
(sort) σ, τ ::= X | µX.σ | C σ | σ0 + σ1 | σ0 × σ1 | int | unit
(container kind) C ::= box | mut const ::= same as COR op ::= same as COR
bool := unit + unit true := inj1 () false := inj0 ()
X ::= (sort variable) x, y ::= (variable) f ::= (predicate variable)
We introduce boxσ and mutσ, which correspond to ownT/immutα T and
mutα T respectively. 〈t〉/〈t∗, t◦〉 is the constructor for boxσ/mutσ. ∗t takes the
body/first value of 〈−〉/〈−,−〉 and ◦t takes the second value of 〈−,−〉. We restrict
the form of CHCs here to simplify the proofs later. Although the logic does not
have a primitive for equality, we can define the equality in a CHC system (e.g.
by adding ∀x:σ.Eq(x, x) ⇐= >).
A CHC system (Φ,Ξ) is a pair of a finite set of CHCs Φ = {Φ0, . . . , Φn−1}
and Ξ, where Ξ is a finite map from predicate variables to tuples of sorts (denoted
by Ξ), specifying the sorts of the input values. Unlike the informal description
in § 1, we add Ξ to a CHC system.
Sort System. ‘t:∆ σ’ (the term t has the sort σ under ∆) is defined as follows.
Here, ∆ is a finite map from variables to sorts. σ ∼ τ is the congruence on sorts
induced by µX.σ ∼ σ[µX.σ/X].
∆(x) = σ
x:∆ σ
t:∆ σ
〈t〉:∆ boxσ
t∗, t◦:∆ σ
〈t∗, t◦〉:∆ mutσ
t:∆ σi
inji t:∆ σ0 + σ1
t0:∆ σ0 t1:∆ σ1
(t0, t1):∆ σ0 × σ1
t:∆ C σ
∗t:∆ σ
t:∆ mutσ
◦t:∆ σ
t:∆ σ0 + σ1
t.i:∆ σi
const :∆ σconst
t, t′:∆ int
t op t′:∆ σop
t:∆ σ σ ∼ τ
t:∆ τ
σconst : the sort of const σop : the output sort of op
‘wellSorted∆,Ξ(ϕ)’ and ‘wellSortedΞ(Φ)’, the judgments on well-sortedness
of formulas and CHCs, are defined as follows.
Ξ(f) = (σ0, . . . , σn−1) for any i ∈ [n], ti:∆ σi
wellSorted∆,Ξ(f(t0, . . . , tn−1))
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∆ = {(xi, σi) | i∈ [m]} wellSorted∆,Ξ(ϕˇ) for any j ∈ [n], wellSorted∆,Ξ(ψj)
wellSortedΞ
(∀x0:σ0, . . . , xm−1:σm−1. ϕˇ ⇐= ψ0 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn−1)
The CHC system (Φ,Ξ) is said to be well-sorted if wellSortedΞ(Φ) holds for any
Φ ∈ Φ.
Semantics. ‘[[t]]I’, the interpretation of the term t as a value under I, is defined
as follows. Here, I is a finite map from variables to values. Although the definition
is partial, the interpretation is defined for all well-sorted terms.
[[x]]I := I(x) [[〈t〉]]I := 〈[[t]]I〉 [[〈t∗, t◦〉]]I := 〈[[t∗]]I, [[t◦]]I〉 [[inji t]]I := inji[[t]]I
[[(t0, t1)]]I := ([[t0]]I, [[t1]]I) [[∗t]]I :=
{
v ([[t]]I = 〈v〉)
v∗ ([[t]]I = 〈v∗, v◦〉)
[[◦t]]I := v◦ if [[t]]I = 〈v∗, v◦〉
[[t.i]]I := vi if [[t]]I = (v0, v1) [[const ]]I := const [[t op t
′]]I := [[t]]I [[op]][[t
′]]I
[[op]]: the binary operation on values corresponding to op
A predicate structure M is a finite map from predicate variables to (concrete)
predicates on values. M, I |= f(t0, . . . , tn−1) means that M(f)([[t0]]I, . . . , [[tn−1]]I)
holds. M |= Φ is defined as follows.
for any I s.t. ∀ i∈ [m]. I(xi):∅ σi, M, I |= ψ0, . . . , ψn−1 implies M, I |= ϕˇ
M |= ∀x0:σ0, . . . , xm−1:σm−1. ϕˇ ⇐= ψ0 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn−1
Finally, M |= (Φ,Ξ) is defined as follows.
for any (f, (σ0, . . . , σn−1)) ∈ Ξ, M(f) is a predicate on values of sort σ0, . . . , σn−1
dom M = dom Ξ for any Φ ∈ Φ, M |= Φ
M |= (Φ,Ξ)
When M |= (Φ,Ξ) holds, we say that M is a model of (Φ,Ξ). Every well-
sorted CHC system (Φ,Ξ) has the least model on the point-wise ordering (which
can be proved based on the discussions in [16]), which we write as Mleast(Φ,Ξ).
3.2 Translation from COR Programs to CHCs
Now we formalize our translation of Rust programs into CHCs. We define (|Π|),
which is a CHC system that represents the input-output relations of the functions
in the COR program Π.
Roughly speaking, the least model Mleast(|Π|) for this CHC system should sat-
isfy: for any values v0, . . . , vn−1, w, Mleast(|Π|) |= fentry(v0, . . . , vn−1, w) holds exactly
if, in COR, a function call f(v0, . . . , vn−1) can return w. Actually, in concrete
operational semantics, such values should be read out from the heap memory.
The formal description and proof of this expected property is presented in §3.3.
Auxiliary Definitions. The sort corresponding to the type T , (|T |), is defined
as follows. Pˇ is a meta-variable for a non-mutable-reference pointer kind, i.e.
own or immutα. Note that the information on lifetimes is all stripped off.
(|X|) := X (|µX.T |) = µX.(|T |) (|Pˇ T |) := box (|T |) (|mutα T |) := mut (|T |)
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(|int|) := int (|unit|) := unit (|T0+T1|) := (|T0|) + (|T1|) (|T0×T1|) := (|T0|)× (|T1|)
We introduce a special variable res to represent the result of a function.19 For
a label L in a function f in a program Π, we define ϕˇΠ,f,L, ΞΠ,f,L and ∆Π,f,L
as follows, if the items in the variable context for the label are enumerated as
x0:
a0 T0, . . . , xn−1:an−1 Tn−1 and the return type of the function is U .
ϕˇΠ,f,L := fL(x0, . . . , xn−1, res) ΞΠ,f,L := ((|T0|), . . . , (|Tn−1|), (|U |))
∆Π,f,L := {(xi, (|Ti|)) | i ∈ [n]}+ {(res, (|U |))}
∀(∆) stands for ∀x0:σ0, . . . , xn−1:σn−1, where the items in ∆ are enumerated
as (x0, σ0), . . . , (xn−1, σn−1).
CHC Representation. Now we introduce ‘(|L:S|)Π,f ’, the set (in most cases,
singleton) of CHCs modeling the computation performed by the labeled state-
ment L:S in f from Π. Unlike informal descriptions in § 1, we turn to pattern
matching instead of equations, to simplify the proofs in Appendix C.3. Below
we show some of the rules; the complete rules are presented in Appendix B. The
variables marked green (e.g. x◦) should be fresh. The following is the rule for
mutable (re)borrow.
(|L: let y = mutborα x; gotoL′|)Π,f
:=

{ ∀(∆Π,f,L+{(x◦, (|T |))}).
ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ [〈∗x, x◦〉/y, 〈x◦〉/x]
}
(TyΠ,f,L(x) = ownT ){ ∀(∆Π,f,L+{(x◦, (|T |))}).
ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ [〈∗x, x◦〉/y, 〈x◦, ◦x〉/x]
}
(TyΠ,f,L(x) = mutα T )
The value at the end of borrow is represented as a newly introduced variable x◦.
Below is the rule for release of a variable.
(|L: dropx; gotoL′|)Π,f
:=

{ ∀(∆Π,f,L). ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ } (TyΠ,f,L(x) = Pˇ T ){ ∀(∆Π,f,L−{(x,mut (|T |))}+{(x∗, (|T |))}).
ϕˇΠ,f,L[〈x∗, x∗〉/x] ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′
}
(TyΠ,f,L(x) = mutα T )
When a variable x of type mutα T is dropped/released, we check the prophesied
value at the end of borrow. Below is the rule for a function call.
(|L: let y = g〈· · ·〉(x0, . . . , xn−1); gotoL′|)Π,f
:= {∀(∆Π,f,L+{(y, (|TyΠ,f,L′(y)|))}). ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= gentry(x0, . . . , xn−1, y) ∧ ϕˇΠ,f,L′}
The body (the right-hand side of ⇐=) of the CHC contains two formulas, which
yields a kind of call stack at the level of CHCs. Below is the rule for a return
from a function.
(|L: returnx|)Π,f :=
{∀(∆Π,f,L). ϕˇΠ,f,L[x/res] ⇐= >}
The variable res is forced to be equal to the returned variable x.
19 For simplicity, we assume that the parameters of each function are sorted respecting
some fixed order on variables (with res coming at the last), and we enumerate various
items in this fixed order.
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Finally, (|Π|), the CHC system that represents the COR program Π (or the
CHC representation of Π), is defined as follows.
(|Π|) := (∑F inΠ,L:S ∈LabelStmtF (|L:S|)Π,name(F ), (ΞΠ,f,L)fL s.t. (f,L)∈FnLabelΠ )
Example 2 (CHC Representation). We present below the CHC representation
of take-max described in § 2.1. We omit CHCs on inc-max here. We have also
excluded the variable binders ‘∀ · · ·’.
take-maxentry(ma,mb, res) ⇐= take-maxL1(ma,mb, 〈∗ma>=∗mb〉, res)
take-maxL1(ma,mb, 〈inj1 ord∗!〉, res) ⇐= take-maxL2(ma,mb, 〈ord∗!〉, res)
take-maxL1(ma,mb, 〈inj0 ord∗!〉, res) ⇐= take-maxL5(ma,mb, 〈ord∗!〉, res)
take-maxL2(ma,mb, ou, res) ⇐= take-maxL3(ma,mb, res)
take-maxL3(ma, 〈mb∗,mb∗〉, res) ⇐= take-maxL4(ma, res)
take-maxL4(ma,ma) ⇐= >
take-maxL5(ma,mb, ou, res) ⇐= take-maxL6(ma,mb, res)
take-maxL6(〈ma∗,ma∗〉,mb, res) ⇐= take-maxL7(mb, res)
take-maxL7(mb,mb) ⇐= >
The fifth and eighth CHC represent release of mb/ma. The sixth and ninth CHC
represent the determination of the return value res.
3.3 Correctness of the CHC Representation
Now we formally state and prove the correctness of the CHC representation.
Notations. We use {|· · ·|} (instead of {· · · }) for multisets.A⊕B (or more generally⊕
λAλ) denotes the multiset sum. For example, {|0, 1|} ⊕ {|1|} = {|0, 1, 1|} 6=
{|0, 1|}.
Readout and Safe Readout. We introduce a few judgments to formally de-
scribe how read out data from the heap.
First, the judgment ‘readoutH(∗a :: T | v; M)’ (the data at the address a of
type T can be read out from the heap H as the value v, yielding the memory
footprint M) is defined as follows.20 Here, a memory footprint M is a finite
multiset of addresses, which is employed for monitoring the memory usage.
H(a) = a′ readoutH(∗a′ :: T | v; M)
readoutH(∗a: ownT | 〈v〉; M⊕{|a|})
readoutH(∗a :: T [µX.T/X] | v; M)
readoutH(∗a :: µX.T/X | v; M)
H(a) = n
readoutH(∗a :: int | n; {|a|}) readoutH(∗a :: unit | (); ∅)
H(a) = i ∈ [2] for any k∈ [(#T1−i−#Ti)≥0], H(a+1+#Ti+k) = 0
readoutH(∗(a+1) :: Ti | v; M)
readoutH
(∗a :: T0+T1 | inji v; M⊕{|a|}⊕{|a+1+#Ti+k | k∈ [(#T1−i−#Ti)≥0]|})
20 Here we can ignore mutable/immutable references, because we focus on what we call
simple functions, as explained later.
RustHorn: CHC-based Verification for Rust Programs (full version) 17
(n)≥0 := max{n, 0}
readoutH
(∗a :: T0 | v0; M0) readoutH(∗(a+#T0) :: T1 | v1; M1)
readoutH
(∗a :: T0×T1 | (v0, v1); M0⊕M1)
For example, ‘readout{(100,7),(101,5)}(∗100 :: int× int | (7, 5); {|100, 101|})’ holds.
Next, ‘readoutH(F :: Γ | F ; M)’ (the data of the stack frame F respecting
the variable context Γ can be read out from H as F , yielding M) is defined as
follows. dom Γ stands for {x | x:a T ∈Γ}.
dom F = dom Γ for any x: ownT ∈ Γ, readoutH(∗F(x) :: T | vx; Mx)
readoutH(F :: Γ | {(x, 〈vx〉) |x∈dom F}; ⊕x∈dom FMx)
Finally, ‘safeH(F :: Γ | F)’ (the data of F respecting Γ can be safely read
out from H as F) is defined as follows.
readoutH(F :: Γ | F ; M) M has no duplicate items
safeH(F :: Γ | F)
Here, the ‘no duplicate items’ precondition checks the safety on the ownership.
COS-based Model. Now we introduce the COS-based model (COS stands for
concrete operational semantics) fCOSΠ to formally describe the expected input-
output relation. Here, for simplicity, f is restricted to one that does not take
lifetime parameters (we call such a function simple; the input/output types
of a simple function cannot contain references). We define fCOSΠ as the pred-
icate (on values of sorts (|T0|), . . . , (|Tn−1|), (|U |) if f ’s input/output types are
T0, . . . , Tn−1, U) given by the following rule.
C0 →Π · · · →Π CN finalΠ(CN ) C0 = [f, entry] F | H CN = [f, L] F′ | H′
safeH
(
F :: ΓΠ,f,entry
∣∣ {(xi, vi) | i∈ [n]}) safeH′(F′ :: ΓΠ,f,L ∣∣ {(y, w)})
fCOSΠ (v0, . . . , vn−1, w)
ΓΠ,f,L: the variable context for the label L of f in the program Π
Correctness Theorem. Finally, the correctness (both soundness and com-
pleteness) of the CHC representation is simply stated as follows.
Theorem 1 (Correctness of the CHC Representation). For any program
Π and simple function f in Π, fCOSΠ is equivalent to M
least
(|Π|) (fentry).
Proof. The details are presented in Appendix C. We outline the proof below.
First, we introduce abstract operational semantics (Appendix C.1), where we
get rid of heaps and directly represent each variable in the program simply as
a value with abstract variables, which is strongly related to prophecy variables
(see § 5). An abstract variable represents the undetermined value of a mutable
reference at the end of borrow.
Next, we introduce SLDC resolution (Appendix C.3) for CHC systems and
find a bisimulation between abstract operational semantics and SLDC resolution
(Lemma 3), whereby we show that the AOS-based model, defined analogously
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to the COS-based model, is equivalent to the least model of the CHC repre-
sentation (Theorem 2). Moreover, we find a bisimulation between concrete and
abstract operational semantics (Lemma 5) and prove that the COS-based model
is equivalent to the AOS-based model (Theorem 3).
Finally, combining the equivalences of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, we achieve
the proof for the correctness of the CHC representation. uunionsq
Interestingly, as by-products of the proof, we have also shown the soundness
of the type system in terms of preservation and progression, in both concrete and
abstract operational semantics. See Appendix C.2 and Appendix C.4 for details.
Simplification and generalization of the proofs is left for future work.
3.4 Advanced Examples
We give advanced examples of pointer-manipulating Rust programs and their
CHC representations. For readability, we write programs in Rust (with ghost
annotations) instead of COR. In addition, CHCs are written in an informal style
like § 1, preferring equalities to pattern matching.
Example 3. Consider the following program, a variant of just_rec in § 1.1.
fn choose<'a>(ma: &'a mut i32, mb: &'a mut i32) -> &'a mut i32 {
if rand() { drop mb; ma } else { drop ma; mb }
}
fn linger_dec<'a>(ma: &'a mut i32) -> bool {
*ma -= 1; if rand() { drop ma; return true; }
let mut b = rand(); let old_b = b; intro 'b; let mb = &'b mut b;
let r2 = linger_dec<'b> (choose<'b> (ma, mb)); now 'b;
r2 && old_b >= b
}
Unlike just_rec, the function linger_dec can modify the local variable of an
arbitrarily deep ancestor. Interestingly, each recursive call to linger_dec can
introduce a new lifetime 'b , which yields arbitrarily many layers of lifetimes.
Suppose we wish to verify that linger_dec never returns false. If we use,
like JustRec+ in § 1.1, a predicate taking the memory states h, h′ and the stack
pointer sp, we have to discover the quantified invariant: ∀ i ≤ sp. h[i] ≥ h′[i]. In
contrast, our approach reduces this verification problem to the following CHCs:
Choose(〈a, a◦〉, 〈b, b◦〉, r) ⇐= b◦ = b ∧ r = 〈a, a◦〉
Choose(〈a, a◦〉, 〈b, b◦〉, r) ⇐= a◦ = a ∧ r = 〈b, b◦〉
LingerDec(〈a, a◦〉, r) ⇐= a′ = a− 1 ∧ a◦ = a′ ∧ r = true
LingerDec(〈a, a◦〉, r) ⇐= a′ = a− 1 ∧ oldb = b ∧ Choose(〈a′, a◦〉, 〈b, b◦〉,mc)
∧ LingerDec(mc, r′) ∧ r = (r′ && oldb >= b◦)
r = true ⇐= LingerDec(〈a, a◦〉, r).
This can be solved by many solvers since it has a very simple model:
Choose(〈a, a◦〉, 〈b, b◦〉, r) :⇐⇒ (b◦ = b ∧ r = 〈a, a◦〉) ∨ (a◦ = a ∧ r = 〈b, b◦〉)
LingerDec(〈a, a◦〉, r) :⇐⇒ r = true ∧ a ≥ a◦.
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Example 4. Combined with recursive data structures, our method turns out to
be more interesting. Let us consider the following Rust code:21
enum List { Cons(i32, Box<List>), Nil } use List::*;
fn take_some<'a>(mxs: &'a mut List) -> &'a mut i32 {
match mxs {
Cons(mx, mxs2) => if rand() { drop mxs2; mx }
else { drop mx; take_some<'a> (mxs2) }
Nil => { take_some(mxs) }
}
}
fn sum(xs: &List) -> i32 {
match xs { Cons(x, xs2) => x + sum(xs2), Nil => 0 }
}
fn inc_some(mut xs: List) -> bool {
let n = sum(&xs); intro 'a; let my = take_some<'a> (&'a mut xs);
*my += 1; drop my; now 'a; let m = sum(&xs); m == n + 1
}
This is a program that manipulates singly linked integer lists, defined as a re-
cursive data type. take_some takes a mutable reference to a list and returns
a mutable reference to some element of the list. sum calculates the sum of the
elements of a list. inc_some increments some element of a list via a mutable
reference and checks that the sum of the elements of the list has increased by 1.
Suppose we wish to verify that inc_some never returns false. Our method
translates this verification problem into the following CHCs.22
TakeSome(〈[x|xs ′], xs◦〉, r) ⇐= xs◦ = [x◦|xs ′◦] ∧ xs ′◦ = xs ′ ∧ r = 〈x, x◦〉
TakeSome(〈[x|xs ′], xs◦〉, r) ⇐= xs◦ = [x◦|xs ′◦] ∧ x◦ = x ∧ TakeSome(〈xs ′, xs ′◦〉, r)
TakeSome(〈[], xs◦〉, r) ⇐= TakeSome(〈[], xs◦〉, r)
Sum(〈[x|xs ′]〉, r) ⇐= Sum(〈xs ′〉, r′) ∧ r = x+ r′
Sum(〈[]〉, r) ⇐= r = 0
IncSome(xs, r) ⇐= Sum(〈xs〉, n) ∧ TakeSome(〈xs,xs◦〉, 〈y, y◦〉) ∧ y◦ = y + 1
∧ Sum(〈xs◦〉,m) ∧ r = (m== n+1)
r = true ⇐= IncSome(xs, r)
A crucial technique used here is subdivision of a mutable reference, which is
achieved with the constraint xs◦ = [x◦|xs ′◦].
We can give this CHC system a very simple model, using an auxiliary function
sum (satisfying sum([x|xs ′]) := x+ sum(xs ′), sum([]) := 0):
TakeSome(〈xs, xs◦〉, 〈y, y◦〉) :⇐⇒ y◦ − y = sum(xs◦)− sum(xs)
Sum(〈xs〉, r) :⇐⇒ r = sum(xs)
IncSome(xs, r) :⇐⇒ r = true.
21 In COR, List can be expressed as µX.int× ownX + unit.
22 [x|xs] is the cons made of the head x and the tail xs. [] is the nil. In our formal logic,
they are expressed as inj0(x, 〈xs〉) and inj1().
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Although the model relies on the function sum, the validity of the model can be
checked without induction on sum (i.e. we can check the validity of each CHC
just by properly unfolding the definition of sum a few times).
The example can be fully automatically and promptly verified by our approach
using HoIce [12,11] as the back-end CHC solver; see § 4.
3.5 Discussions
We discuss here how our idea can be extended and enhanced.
Applying Various Verification Techniques. Our idea can also be expressed as a
translation of a pointer-manipulating Rust program into a program of a stateless
functional programming language, which allows us to use various verification
techniques not limited to CHCs. Access to future information can be modeled
using non-determinism. To express the value a◦ coming at the end of mutable
borrow in CHCs, we just randomly guess the value with non-determinism. At
the time we actually release a mutable reference, we just check a' = a and cut
off execution branches that do not pass the check.
For example, take_max/inc_max in § 1.2/Example 1 can be translated into
the following OCaml program.
let rec assume b = if b then () else assume b
let take_max (a, a') (b, b') =
if a >= b then (assume (b' = b); (a, a'))
else (assume (a' = a); (b, b'))
let inc_max a b =
let a' = Random.int(0) in let b' = Random.int(0) in
let (c, c') = take_max (a, a') (b, b') in
assume (c' = c + 1); not (a' = b')
let main a b = assert (inc_max a b)
‘let a' = Random.int(0)’ expresses a random guess and ‘assume (a' = a)’
expresses a check. The original problem “Does inc_max never return false?”
is reduced to the problem “Does main never fail at assertion?” on the OCaml
program.23
This representation allows us to use various verification techniques, including
model checking (higher-order, temporal, bounded, etc.), semi-automated verifi-
cation (e.g. on Boogie [48]) and verification on proof assistants (e.g. Coq [15]).
The property to be verified can be not only partial correctness, but also total
correctness and liveness. Further investigation is left for future work.
23 MoCHi [39], a higher-order model checker for OCaml, successfully verified the safety
property for the OCaml representation above. It also successfully and instantly ver-
ified a similar representation of choose/linger_dec at Example 3.
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Verifying Higher-order Programs. We have to care about the following points in
modeling closures: (i) A closure that encloses mutable references can be encoded
as a pair of the main function and the ‘drop function’ called when the closure is
released; (ii) A closure that updates enclosed data can be encoded as a function
that returns, with the main return value, the updated version of the closure;
(iii) A closure that updates external data through enclosed mutable references
can also be modeled by combination of (i) and (ii). Further investigation on
verification of higher-order Rust programs is left for future work.
Libraries with Unsafe Code. Our translation does not use lifetime information;
the correctness of our method is guaranteed by the nature of borrow. Whereas
lifetimes are used for static check of the borrow discipline, many libraries in Rust
(e.g. RefCell) provide a mechanism for dynamic ownership check.
We believe that such libraries with unsafe code can be verified for our method
by a separation logic such as Iris [35,33], as RustBelt [32] does. A good news
is that Iris has recently incorporated prophecy variables [34], which seems to fit
well with our approach. This is an interesting topic for future work.
After the libraries are verified, we can turn to our method. For an easy
example, Vec [58] can be represented simply as a functional array; a muta-
ble/immutable slice &mut[T]/&[T] can be represented as an array of muta-
ble/immutable references. For another example, to deal with RefCell [56], we
pass around an array that maps a RefCell<T> address to data of type T equipped
with an ownership counter; RefCell itself is modeled simply as an address.2425
Importantly, at the very time we take a mutable reference 〈a, a◦〉 from a ref-cell,
the data at the array should be updated into a◦. Using methods such as pointer
analysis [61], we can possibly shrink the array.
Still, our method does not go quite well with memory leaks [52] caused for
example by combination of RefCell and Rc [57], because they obfuscate the
ownership release of mutable references. We think that use of Rc etc. should
rather be restricted for smooth verification. Further investigation is needed.
4 Implementation and Evaluation
We report on the implementation of our verification tool and the preliminary
experiments conducted with small benchmarks to confirm the effectiveness of
our approach.
4.1 Implementation of RustHorn
We implemented a prototype verification tool RustHorn (available at https:
//github.com/hopv/rust-horn) based on the ideas described above. The tool
24 To borrow a mutable/immutable reference from RefCell, we check and update the
counter and take out the data from the array.
25 In Rust, we can use RefCell to naturally encode data types with circular references
(e.g. doubly-linked lists).
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supports basic features of Rust supported in COR, including recursions and
recursive types especially.
The implementation translates the MIR (Mid-level Intermediate Representa-
tion) [45,51] of a Rust program into CHCs quite straightforwardly.26 Thanks to
the nature of the translation, RustHorn can just rely on Rust’s borrow check and
forget about lifetimes. For efficiency, the predicate variables are constructed by
the granularity of the vertices in the control-flow graph in MIR, unlike the per-
label construction of § 3.2. Also, assertions in functions are taken into account
unlike the formalization in § 3.2.
4.2 Benchmarks and Experiments
To measure the performance of RustHorn and the existing CHC-based verifier
SeaHorn [23], we conducted preliminary experiments with benchmarks listed in
Table 1. Each benchmark program is designed so that the Rust and C versions
match. Each benchmark instance consists of either one program or a pair of safe
and unsafe programs that are very similar to each other. The benchmarks and
experimental results are accessible at https://github.com/hopv/rust-horn.
The benchmarks in the groups simple and bmc were taken from SeaHorn
(https://github.com/seahorn/seahorn/tree/master/test), with the Rust
versions written by us. They have been chosen based on the following criteria:
they (i) consist of only features supported by core Rust, (ii) follow Rust’s owner-
ship discipline, and (iii) are small enough to be amenable for manual translation
from C to Rust.
The remaining six benchmark groups are built by us and consist of programs
featuring mutable references. The groups inc-max, just-rec and linger-dec
are based on the examples that have appeared in § 1 and § 3.4. The group
swap-dec consists of programs that perform repeated involved updates via mu-
table references to mutable references. The groups lists and trees feature
destructive updates on recursive data structures (lists and trees) via mutable
references, with one interesting program of it explained in § 3.4.
We conducted experiments on a commodity laptop (2.6GHz Intel Core i7
MacBook Pro with 16GB RAM). First we translated each benchmark program
by RustHorn and SeaHorn (version 0.1.0-rc3) [23] translate into CHCs in the
SMT-LIB 2 format. Both RustHorn and SeaHorn generated CHCs sufficiently
fast (about 0.1 second for each program). After that, we measured the time of
CHC solving by Spacer [40] in Z3 (version 4.8.7) [69] and HoIce (version 1.8.1)
[12,11] for the generated CHCs. SeaHorn’s outputs were not accepted by HoIce,
especially because SeaHorn generates CHCs with arrays. We also made modified
versions for some of SeaHorn’s CHC outputs, adding constraints on address
freshness, to improve accuracy of representations and reduce false alarms.27
26 In order to use the MIR, RustHorn’s implementation depends on the unstable nightly
version of the Rust compiler, which causes a slight portability issue.
27 For base/3 and repeat/3 of inc-max, the address-taking parts were already removed,
probably by inaccurate pointer analysis.
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4.3 Experimental Results
Table 1 shows the results of the experiments.
Interestingly, the combination of RustHorn and HoIce succeeded in verify-
ing many programs with recursive data types (lists and trees), although it
failed at difficult programs.28 HoIce, unlike Spacer, can find models defined with
primitive recursive functions for recursive data types.29
False alarms of SeaHorn for the last six groups are mainly due to problematic
approximation of SeaHorn for pointers and heap memories, as discussed in §1.1.
On the modified CHC outputs of SeaHorn, five false alarms were erased and four
of them became successful. For the last four groups, unboundedly many mem-
ory cells can be allocated, which imposes a fundamental challenge for SeaHorn’s
array-based approach as discussed in §1.1.30 The combination of RustHorn and
HoIce took a relatively long time or reported timeout for some programs, includ-
ing unsafe ones, because HoIce is still an unstable tool compared to Spacer; in
general, automated CHC solving can be rather unstable.
5 Related Work
CHC-based Verification of Pointer-Manipulating Programs. SeaHorn [23] is a
representative existing tool for CHC-based verification of pointer-manipulating
programs. It basically represents the heap memory as an array. Although some
pointer analyses [24] are used to optimize the array representation of the heap,
their approach suffers from the scalability problem discussed in §1.1, as confirmed
by the experiments in § 4. Still, their approach is quite effective as automated
verification, given that many real-world pointer-manipulating programs do not
follow Rust-style ownership.
Another approach is taken by JayHorn [37,36], which translates Java pro-
grams (possibly using object pointers) to CHCs. They represent store invariants
using special predicates pull and push. Although this allows faster reasoning
about the heap than the array-based approach, it can suffer from more false
alarms. We conducted a small experiment for JayHorn (0.6-alpha) on some of
the benchmarks of § 4.2; unexpectedly, JayHorn reported ‘UNKNOWN’ (instead of
‘SAFE’ or ‘UNSAFE’) for even simple programs such as the programs of the instance
unique-scalar in simple and the instance basic in inc-max.
Verification for Rust. Whereas we have presented the first CHC-based (fully au-
tomated) verification method specially designed for Rust-style ownership, there
have been a number of studies on other types of verification for Rust.
28 For example, inc-some/2 takes two mutable references in a list and increments on
them; inc-all-t destructively increments all elements in a tree.
29 We used the latest version of HoIce, whose algorithm for recursive types is presented
in the full paper of [11].
30 We also tried on Spacer JustRec+, the stack-pointer-based accurate representation
of just_rec presented in § 1.1, but we got timeout of 180 seconds.
24 Y. Matsushita et al.
RustHorn SeaHorn w/Spacer
Group Instance Property w/Spacer w/HoIce as is modified
simple
01 safe <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
04-recursive safe 0.5 timeout 0.8
05-recursive unsafe <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
06-loop safe timeout 0.1 timeout
hhk2008 safe timeout 40.5 <0.1
unique-scalar unsafe <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
bmc
1
safe 0.2 <0.1 <0.1
unsafe 0.2 <0.1 <0.1
2
safe timeout 0.1 <0.1
unsafe <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
3
safe <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
unsafe <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
diamond-1
safe 0.1 <0.1 <0.1
unsafe <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
diamond-2
safe 0.2 <0.1 <0.1
unsafe <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
inc-max
base
safe <0.1 <0.1 false alarm <0.1
unsafe <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
base/3
safe <0.1 <0.1 false alarm
unsafe 0.1 <0.1 <0.1
repeat
safe 0.1 timeout false alarm 0.1
unsafe <0.1 0.4 <0.1 <0.1
repeat/3
safe 0.2 timeout <0.1
unsafe <0.1 1.3 <0.1
swap-dec
base
safe <0.1 <0.1 false alarm <0.1
unsafe 0.1 timeout <0.1 <0.1
base/3
safe 0.2 timeout false alarm <0.1
unsafe 0.4 0.9 <0.1 0.1
exact
safe 0.1 0.5 false alarm timeout
unsafe <0.1 26.0 <0.1 <0.1
exact/3
safe timeout timeout false alarm false alarm
unsafe <0.1 0.4 <0.1 <0.1
just-rec base
safe <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
unsafe <0.1 0.1 <0.1
linger-dec
base
safe <0.1 <0.1 false alarm
unsafe <0.1 0.1 <0.1
base/3
safe <0.1 <0.1 false alarm
unsafe <0.1 7.0 <0.1
exact
safe <0.1 <0.1 false alarm
unsafe <0.1 0.2 <0.1
exact/3
safe <0.1 <0.1 false alarm
unsafe <0.1 0.6 <0.1
lists
append
safe tool error <0.1 false alarm
unsafe tool error 0.2 0.1
inc-all
safe tool error <0.1 false alarm
unsafe tool error 0.3 <0.1
inc-some
safe tool error <0.1 false alarm
unsafe tool error 0.3 0.1
inc-some/2
safe tool error timeout false alarm
unsafe tool error 0.3 0.4
trees
append-t
safe tool error <0.1 timeout
unsafe tool error 0.3 0.1
inc-all-t
safe tool error timeout timeout
unsafe tool error 0.1 <0.1
inc-some-t
safe tool error timeout timeout
unsafe tool error 0.3 0.1
inc-some/2-t
safe tool error timeout false alarm
unsafe tool error 0.4 0.1
Table 1. Benchmarks and experimental results on RustHorn and SeaHorn, with
Spacer/Z3 and HoIce. “timeout” denotes timeout of 180 seconds; “false alarm” means
reporting ‘unsafe’ for a safe program; “tool error” is a tool error of Spacer, which
currently does not deal with recursive types well.
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RustBelt [32] aims to formally prove high-level safety properties for Rust
libraries with unsafe internal implementation, using manual reasoning on the
higher-order concurrent separation logic Iris [35,33] on the Coq Proof Assistant
[15]. Although their framework is flexible, the automation of the reasoning on
the framework is little discussed. The language design of our COR is affected by
their formal calculus λRust.
Electrolysis [67] translates some subset of Rust into a purely functional pro-
gramming language to manually verify functional correctness on Lean Theorem
Prover [49]. Although it clears out pointers to get simple models like our ap-
proach, Electrolysis’ applicable scope is quite limited, because it deals with mu-
table references by simple static tracking of addresses based on lenses [20], not
supporting even basic use cases such as dynamic selection of mutable references
(e.g. take_max in §1.2) [66], which our method can easily handle. Our approach
covers all usages of pointers of the safe core of Rust as discussed in § 3.
Some serial studies [27,3,17] conduct (semi-)automated verification on Rust
programs using Viper [50], a verification platform based on separation logic with
fractional ownership. This approach can to some extent deal with unsafe code
[27] and type traits [17]. Astrauskas et al. [3] conduct semi-automated verifi-
cation (manually providing pre/post-conditions and loop invariants) on many
realistic examples. Because Viper is based on fractional ownership, however,
their platforms have to use concrete indexing on the memory for programs like
take_max/inc_max. In contrast, our idea leverages borrow-based ownership, and
it can be applied also to semi-automated verification as suggested in § 3.5.
Some researches [65,4,44] employ bounded model checking on Rust programs,
especially with unsafe code. Our method can be applied to bounded model check-
ing as discussed in § 3.5.
Verification using Ownership. Ownership has been applied to a wide range of
verification. It has been used for detecting race conditions on concurrent pro-
grams [8,64] and analyzing the safety of memory allocation [63]. Separation logic
based on ownership is also studied well [7,50,35]. Some verification platforms
[14,5,21] support simple ownership. However, most prior studies on ownership-
based verification are based on fractional or counting ownership. Verification
under borrow-based ownership like Rust was little studied before our work.
Prophecy Variables. Our idea of taking a future value to represent a mutable
reference is linked to the notion of prophecy variables [1,68,34]. Jung et al. [34]
propose a new Hoare-style logic with prophecy variables. In their logic, prophecy
variables are not copyable, which is analogous to uncopyability of mutable ref-
erences in Rust. This logic can probably be used for generalizing our idea as
suggested in § 3.5.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a novel method for CHC-based program verification, which
represents a mutable reference as a pair of values, the current value and the
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future value at the time of release. We have formalized the method for a core
language of Rust and proved its correctness. We have implemented a proto-
type verification tool for a subset of Rust and confirmed the effectiveness of our
approach. We believe that this study establishes the foundation of verification
leveraging borrow-based ownership.
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A Complementary Definitions on COR
A.1 Complete Typing Rules for Instructions
The following is the complete rules for the typing judgment on instructions
I:Π,f (Γ,A)→ (Γ′,A′). The variables on the right-hand side of one instruction
should be mutually distinct. The rules for subtyping T ≤A U are explained later.
α /∈ AexΠ,f P = own,mutβ for any γ ∈ LifetimeP T , α ≤A γ
let y = mutborα x :Π,f (Γ+{x:P T}, A)→ (Γ+{y:mutα T, x:†α P T}, A)
if T is of form ownU , every own and mutα in U is guarded by some immutβ
dropx :Π,f (Γ+{x:T}, A)→ (Γ,A)
immutx :Π,f (Γ+{x:mutα T}, A)→ (Γ+{x: immutα T}, A)
x:mutα T, y:P T ∈ Γ P = own,mutβ
swap(∗x, ∗y) :Π,f (Γ,A)→ (Γ,A)
let ∗y = x :Π,f (Γ+{x:T}, A)→ (Γ+{y: ownT}, A)
let y = ∗x :Π,f (Γ+{x:P P ′ T}, A)→ (Γ+{y: (P ◦P ′)T}, A)
P ◦ own = own ◦ P := P Rα ◦R′β := R′′α where R′′ =
{
mut (R = R′ = mut)
immut (otherwise)
x:P T ∈ Γ T : copy
let ∗y = copy ∗x :Π,f (Γ,A)→ (Γ+{y: ownT}, A)
int: copy unit: copy immutα T : copy
T : copy
µX.T : copy
T0, T1 : copy
T0+T1 : copy
T0, T1 : copy
T0×T1 : copy
T ≤A U
x as U :Π,f (Γ+{x:T}, A)→ (Γ+{x:U}, A)
ΣΠ,g = 〈α′0, . . . , α′m−1 | α′a0 ≤ α′b0 , . . . , α′al−1 ≤ α′bl−1〉(x′0:T ′0, . . . , x′n−1:T ′n−1)→ T ′n
for any j ∈ [l], αaj ≤A αbj for any i ∈ [n+1], Ti = T ′i [α0/α′0, . . . , αm−1/α′m−1]
let y = g〈α0, . . . , αm−1〉(x0, . . . , xn−1) :Π,f (Γ+{xi:Ti | i ∈ [n]}, A)→ (Γ+{y:Tn}, A)
ΣΠ,f : the function signature of the function f in Π
introα :Π,f
(
Γ, (A,R)
)→ (Γ, ({α}+A, {α}×({α}+AexΠ,f )+R))
α /∈ AexΠ,f
nowα :Π,f
(
Γ, ({α}+A, R))→ ({thawα(x:a T ) | x:a T ∈Γ}, (A, {(β, γ)∈R | β 6=α}))
thawα(x:
a T ) :=
{
x:T (a = †α)
x:a T (otherwise)
α, β /∈ AexΠ,f
α ≤ β :Π,f
(
Γ, (A,R)
)→ (Γ, (A, ({(α, β)} ∪R)+))
let ∗y = const :Π,f (Γ,A)→ (Γ+{y: ownTconst}, A)
Tconst : the type of const (int or unit)
x:P int, x′:P ′ int ∈ Γ
let ∗y = ∗x op ∗x′ :Π,f (Γ,A)→ (Γ+{y: ownTop}, A)
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Top : the output type of op (int or bool)
let ∗y = rand() :Π,f (Γ,A)→ (Γ+{y: own int}, A)
let ∗y = injT0+T1i ∗x :Π,f (Γ+{x: ownTi}, A)→ (Γ+{y: own (T0+T1)}, A)
let ∗y = (∗x0, ∗x1) :Π,f (Γ+{x0: ownT0, x1: ownT1}, A)→ (Γ+{y: own (T0×T1)}, A)
let (∗y0, ∗y1) = ∗x :Π,f (Γ+{x:P (T0×T1)}, A)→ (Γ+{y0:P T0, y1:P T1}, A)
Rule for Drop. The precondition for the typing rule on dropx is just for sim-
plicity on formal definitions. For concrete operational semantics, a non-guarded
own within ownU causes nested releases of memory cells. For translation to
CHCs, a non-guarded mut within ownU would make value checks complicated.
This precondition does not weaken the expressivity, because we can divide
pointers by dereference (let y = ∗x), pair destruction (let (∗y0, ∗y1) = ∗x) and
variant destruction (match ∗x {· · ·}) (possibly using loops/recursions, for recur-
sive types).
Rule for Swap. We can omit swap between two owning pointers because it is
essentially the same thing with just swapping the names of the pointers. Note
that an active (i.e. not frozen) owning pointer has no other alias at all.
Subtyping. The subtyping judgment Ξ ` T ≤A U is defined as follows. Here,
Ξ is a set of assumptions of form T ≤U , which is used for subtyping on recursive
types. ∅ ` T ≤AU can be shortened into T ≤AU .
T ≤U ∈ Ξ
Ξ ` T ≤AU
Ξ ` T ≤AU
Ξ ` Pˇ T ≤A Pˇ U
Ξ ` T ≤AU, U≤AT
Ξ ` mutα T ≤Amutα U
Ξ ` β≤Aα
Ξ ` Rα T ≤ARβ T
Ξ ` T0≤AU0, T1≤AU1
Ξ ` T0+T1≤AU0+U1
Ξ ` T0≤AU0, T1≤AU1
Ξ ` T0×T1≤AU0×U1
Ξ ` µX.T ≤AT [µX.T/X], T [µX.T/X]≤AµX.T
X ′, Y ′ are fresh in Ξ Ξ + {X ′≤Y ′} ` T [X ′/X]≤AU [Y ′/Y ]
Ξ ` µX.T ≤AµY.U
X ′, Y ′ are fresh in Ξ
Ξ + {X ′≤Y ′, Y ′≤X ′} ` T [X ′/X]≤AU [Y ′/Y ], U [Y ′/Y ]≤AT [X ′/X]
Ξ ` µX.T ≤AµY.U, µY.U≤AµX.T
Ξ ` T ≤AT Ξ ` T ≤AT
′, T ′≤AT ′′
Ξ ` T ≤AT ′′
A.2 Complete Rules and an Example Execution for Concrete
Operational Semantics
The following is the complete rules for the judgments C→Π C′ and finalΠ(C).
SΠ,f,L = let y = mutborα x; gotoL
′ F(x) = a
[f, L] F; S | H →Π [f, L′] F+{(y, a)}; S | H
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SΠ,f,L = dropx; gotoL
′ TyΠ,f,L(x) = ownT
[f, L] F+{(x, a)}; S | H+{(a+k, nk) |k∈ [#T ]} →Π [f, L′] F; S | H
SΠ,f,L = dropx; gotoL
′ TyΠ,f,L(x) = Rα T
[f, L] F+{(x, a)}; S | H →Π [f, L′] F; S | H
SΠ,f,L = immutx; gotoL
′
[f, L] F; S | H →Π [f, L′] F; S | H
SΠ,f,L = swap(∗x, ∗y); gotoL′ TyΠ,f,L(x) = P T F(x) = a F(y) = b
[f, L] F; S | H+{(a+k,mk) |k∈ [#T ]}+{(b+k, nk) |k∈ [#T ]}
→Π [f, L′] F; S | H+{(a+k, nk) |k∈ [#T ]}+{(b+k,mk) |k∈ [#T ]}
SΠ,f,L = let ∗y = x; gotoL′
[f, L] F+{(x, a′)}; S | H →Π [f, L′] F+{(y, a)}; S | H+{(a, a′)}
SΠ,f,L = let y = ∗x; gotoL′ TyΠ,f,L(x) = ownP T
[f, L] F+{(x, a)}; S | H+{(a, a′)} →Π [f, L′] F+{(y, a′)}; S | H
SΠ,f,L = let y = ∗x; gotoL′ TyΠ,f,L(x) = Rα P T H(a) = a′
[f, L] F+{(x, a)}; S | H →Π [f, L′] F+{(y, a′)}; S | H
SΠ,f,L = let ∗y = copy ∗x; gotoL′ TyΠ,f,L(x) = P T F(x) = a
[f, L] F; S | H →Π [f, L′] F+{(y, b)}; S | H+{(b+k,H(a+k)) |k∈ [#T ]}
SΠ,f,L = I; gotoL
′ I = x as T, introα, nowα, α ≤ β
[f, L] F; S | H →Π [f, L′] F; S | H
SΠ,f,L = let y = g〈· · ·〉(x0, . . . , xn−1); gotoL′
ΣΠ,g = 〈· · ·〉(x′0:T0, . . . , x′n−1:Tn−1)→ U
[f, L] F+{(xi, ai) | i∈ [n]}; S | H→Π [g, entry] {(x′i, ai) | i∈ [n]}; [f, L] y,F; S | H
SΠ,f,L = returnx
[f, L] {(x, a)}; [g, L′]x′,F′; S | H→Π [g, L′] F′+{(x′, a)}; S | H
SΠ,f,L = returnx
finalΠ
(
[f, L] {(x, a)} | H)
SΠ,f,L = let ∗y = const ; gotoL′ H′ =
{
{(a, n)} (const = n)
∅ (const = ())
[f, L] F; S | H →Π [f, L′] F+{(y, a)}; S | H+H′
SΠ,f,L = let ∗y = ∗x op ∗x′; gotoL′ F(x) = a F(x′) = a′
[f, L] F; S | H →Π [f, L′] F+{(y, b)}; S | H+{(b, H(a) 〈op〉H(a′))}
〈op〉: op as a binary operation on integers, with true/false encoded as 1/0
SΠ,f,L = let ∗y = rand(); gotoL′
[f, L] F; S | H →Π [f, L′] F+{(y, a)}; S | H+{(a, n)}
SΠ,f,L = let ∗y = injT0+T1i ∗x; gotoL′ H0 = {(a′+1+#Ti+k, 0) | k∈ [(#T1−i−#Ti)≥0]}
[f, L] F+{(x, a)}; S | H+{(a+k,mk) |k∈ [#Ti]}
→Π [f, L′] F+{(y, a′)}; S | H+{(a′, i)}+{(a′+1+k,mk) |k∈ [#Ti]}+H0
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SΠ,f,L = match ∗x {inj0 ∗y0 → gotoL′0, inj1 ∗y1 → gotoL′1}
TyΠ,f,L(x) = own (T0+T1) i ∈ [2] H0 = {(a+1+#Ti+k, 0) | k ∈ [(#T1−i−#Ti)≥0]}
[f, L] F+{(x, a)}; S | H+{(a, i)}+{(a+1+k,mk) | k∈ [#Ti]}+H0
→Π [f, L′i] F+{(yi, a+1)}; S | H+{(a+1+k,mk) | k∈ [#Ti]}
SΠ,f,L = match ∗x {inj0 ∗y0 → gotoL′0, inj1 ∗y1 → gotoL′1}
TyΠ,f,L(x) = Rα (T0+T1) H(a) = i ∈ [2]
[f, L] F+{(x, a)}; S | H →Π [f, L′i] F+{(yi, a+1)}; S | H
SΠ,f,L = let ∗y = (∗x0, ∗x1); gotoL′ for each i ∈ [2], TyΠ,f,L(xi) = ownTi
[f, L] F+{(x0, a0), (x1, a1)}; S | H+{(ai+k,mik) | i∈ [2], k∈ [#Ti]}
→Π [f, L′] F+{(y, a′)}; S | H+{(a′+i#T0+k, mik) | i∈ [2], k∈ [#Ti]}
SΠ,f,L = let (∗y0, ∗y1) = ∗x; gotoL′ TyΠ,f,L(x) = P (T0×T1)
[f, L] F+{(x, a)}; S | H →Π [f, L′] F+{(y0, a), (y1, a+#T0)}; S | H
Example 5 (Execution on Concrete Operational Semantics). The following is an
example execution for the COR program of Example 1. ♠,♥,♦,♣ represent
some distinct addresses (e.g. 100, 101, 102, 103). →Π is abbreviated as →.
[inc-max, entry] {(oa,♠), (ob,♥)} | {(♠, 4), (♥, 3)}
→ [inc-max, L1] {(oa,♠), (ob,♥)} | {(♠, 4), (♥, 3)}
→+ [inc-max, L3] {(ma,♠), (mb,♥), (oa,♠), (ob,♥)} | {(♠, 4), (♥, 3)}
→ [take-max, entry] {(ma,♠), (mb,♥)};
[inc-max, L4] mc, {(oa,♠), (ob,♥)} | {(♠, 4), (♥, 3)}
→ [take-max, L1] {(ord ,♦), (ma,♠), (mb,♥)};
[inc-max, L4] mc,{(oa,♠), (ob,♥)} | {(♠, 4), (♥, 3), (♦, 1)}
→ [take-max, L2] {(ou,♦+1), (ma,♠), (mb,♥)};
[inc-max, L4] mc, {(oa,♠), (ob,♥)} | {(♠, 4), (♥, 3)}
→+ [take-max, L4] {(ma,♠)};
[inc-max, L4] mc, {(oa,♠), (ob,♥)} | {(♠, 4), (♥, 3)}
→ [inc-max, L4] {(mc,♠), (oa,♠), (ob,♥)} | {(♠, 4), (♥, 3)}
→ [inc-max, L5] {(o1 ,♦), (mc,♠), (oa,♠), (ob,♥)} | {(♠, 4), (♥, 3), (♦, 1)}
→+ [inc-max, L7] {(oc′,♣), (mc,♠), (oa,♠), (ob,♥)} | {(♠, 4), (♥, 3), (♣, 5)}
→ [inc-max, L8] {(oc′,♣), (mc,♠), (oa,♠), (ob,♥)} | {(♠, 5), (♥, 3), (♣, 4)}
→+ [inc-max, L10] {(oa,♠), (ob,♥)} | {(♠, 5), (♥, 3)}
→ [inc-max, L11] {(oa,♠), (ob,♥)} | {(♠, 5), (♥, 3)}
→+ [inc-max, L14] {(ores,♦)} | {(♦, 1)}
The execution is quite straightforward. Recall that every variable is a pointer
and holds just an address. Most of the data is stored in the heap.
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B Complete Rules for Translation from Labeled
Statements to CHCs
We present below the complete rules for (|L:S|)Π,f .
(|L: let y = mutborα x; gotoL′|)Π,f
:=

{ ∀(∆Π,f,L+{(x◦, (|T |))}).
ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ [〈∗x, x◦〉/y, 〈x◦〉/x]
}
(TyΠ,f,L(x) = ownT ){ ∀(∆Π,f,L+{(x◦, (|T |))}).
ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ [〈∗x, x◦〉/y, 〈x◦, ◦x〉/x]
}
(TyΠ,f,L(x) = mutα T )
(|L: dropx; gotoL′|)Π,f
:=

{ ∀(∆Π,f,L). ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ } (TyΠ,f,L(x) = Pˇ T ){ ∀(∆Π,f,L−{(x,mut (|T |))}+{(x∗, (|T |))}).
ϕˇΠ,f,L[〈x∗, x∗〉/x] ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′
}
(TyΠ,f,L(x) = mutα T )
(|L: immutx; gotoL′|)Π,f
:=
{ ∀(∆Π,f,L−{(x,mut (|T |))}+{(x∗, (|T |))}).
ϕˇΠ,f,L[〈x∗, x∗〉/x] ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ [〈x∗〉/x]
}
(TyΠ,f,L(x) = mutα T )
(|L: swap(∗x, ∗y); gotoL′|)Π,f
:=
{
{ ∀(∆Π,f,L). ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ [〈∗y, ◦x〉/x, 〈∗x〉/y] } (TyΠ,f,L(y) = ownT ){ ∀(∆Π,f,L). ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ [〈∗y, ◦x〉/x, 〈∗x, ◦y〉/y]} (TyΠ,f,L(y) = mutα T )
(|L: let ∗y = x; gotoL′|)Π,f :=
{ ∀(∆Π,f,L). ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ [〈x〉/y]}
(|L: let y = ∗x; gotoL′|)Π,f
:=

{∀(∆Π,f,L). ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ [∗x/y]} (TyΠ,f,L(x) = ownP T ){∀(∆Π,f,L). ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ [〈∗∗x〉/y]} (TyΠ,f,L(x) = immutα P T )
{ ∀(∆Π,f,L). ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ [〈∗∗x, ∗◦x〉/y] } (TyΠ,f,L(x) = mutα ownT ){ ∀(∆Π,f,L−{(x,mut box (|T |))}+{(x∗, box (|T |))}).
ϕˇΠ,f,L[〈x∗, x∗〉/x] ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ [x∗/y]
}
(TyΠ,f,L(x) = mutα immutβ T )
∀(∆Π,f,L−{(x,mutmut (|T |))}
+{(x∗∗, (|T |)), (x∗◦, (|T |)), (x◦∗, (|T |))}).
ϕˇΠ,f,L[〈〈x∗∗, x∗◦〉, 〈x◦∗, x∗◦〉〉/x]
⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ [〈x∗∗, x◦∗〉/y]
 (TyΠ,f,L(x) = mutαmutβ T )
(|L: let ∗y = copy ∗x; gotoL′|)Π,f :=
{∀(∆Π,f,L). ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ [〈∗x〉/y]}
(|L:x as T ; gotoL′|)Π,f :=
{ ∀(∆Π,f,L). ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ }
(|L: let y = g〈· · ·〉(x0, . . . , xn−1); gotoL′|)Π,f
:= {∀(∆Π,f,L+{(y, (|TyΠ,f,L′(y)|))}). ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= gentry(x0, . . . , xn−1, y) ∧ ϕˇΠ,f,L′}
(|L: returnx|)Π,f :=
{∀(∆Π,f,L). ϕˇΠ,f,L[x/res] ⇐= >}
(|L: introα; gotoL′|)Π,f = (|L: nowα; gotoL′|)Π,f = (|L:α ≤ β; gotoL′|)Π,f
:=
{ ∀(∆Π,f,L). ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ }
(|L: let ∗y = const ; gotoL′|)Π,f :=
{ ∀(∆Π,f,L). ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ [〈const〉/y]}
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(|L: let ∗y = ∗x op ∗x′; gotoL′|)Π,f :=
{ ∀(∆Π,f,L). ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ [〈∗x op ∗x′〉/y]}
(|L: let ∗y = rand(); gotoL′|)Π,f :=
{∀(∆Π,f,L′). ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ }
(|L: let ∗y = injT0+T1i ∗x; gotoL′|)Π,f :=
{ ∀(∆Π,f,L). ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ [〈inji ∗x〉/y]}
(|L:match ∗x {inj0 ∗y0 → gotoL0, inj1 ∗y1 → gotoL1}|)Π,f
:=
{
∀(∆Π,f,Li − {(x,mut((|T0|)+(|T1|)))}+ {(x∗!, (|Ti|))}).
ϕˇΠ,f,L[〈inji x∗!〉/x] ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,Li [〈x∗!〉/yi]
∣∣∣∣∣ i ∈ [2]
}
if TyΠ,f,L(x) = Pˇ (T0+T1)
(|L:match ∗x {inj0 ∗y0 → gotoL0, inj1 ∗y1 → gotoL1}|)Π,f
:=
{
∀(∆Π,f,Li − {(x,mut((|T0|)+(|T1|)))}+ {(x∗!, (|Ti|)), (x◦!, (|Ti|))}).
ϕˇΠ,f,L[〈inji x∗!, inji x◦i〉/x] ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,Li [〈x∗!, x◦!〉/yi]
∣∣∣∣∣ i ∈ [2]
}
if TyΠ,f,L(x) = mutα(T0+T1)
(|L: let ∗y = (∗x0, ∗x1); gotoL′|)Π,f
:=
{ ∀(∆Π,f,L). ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ [〈(∗x0, ∗x1)〉/y]}
(|L: let (∗y0, ∗y1) = ∗x; gotoL′|)Π,f
:=

{ ∀(∆Π,f,L). ϕˇΠ,f,L
⇐= ϕˇΠ,f,L′ [〈(∗x).0〉/y0, 〈(∗x).1〉/y1]
}
(TyΠ,f,L(x) = Pˇ T ){ ∀(∆Π,f,L). ϕˇΠ,f,L ⇐=
ϕˇΠ,f,L′ [〈(∗x).0, (◦x).0〉/y0, 〈(∗x).1, (◦x).1〉/y1]
}
(TyΠ,f,L(x) = mutα T )
Rule for Dereference. The rule for dereference (let y = ∗x) may seem com-
plicated at a glance. It is however just because this single instruction can cause
multiple events (dereference and release of a mutable reference).
C Proof of the Correctness of the CHC Representation
C.1 Abstract Operational Semantics
We introduce abstract operation semantics for COR, as a mediator between
concrete operational semantics and the logic. In abstract operational semantics,
we get rid of heaps and directly represent each variable as a value with such
future values expressed as abstract variables x (marked bold and light blue),
which is strongly related to prophecy variables. An abstract variable represents
the undetermined value of a mutable reference at the end of borrow.
Formally, we introduce a pre-value, which is defined as follows:
(pre-value) vˆ, wˆ ::= 〈vˆ〉 | 〈vˆ∗, vˆ◦〉 | inji vˆ | (vˆ0, vˆ1) | const | x.
Abstract operational semantics is described as transition on program states
encoded as an abstract configuration C, which is defined as follows. Here, an
abstract stack frame F maps variables to pre-values. We may omit the terminator
‘; end’.
S ::= end ∣∣ [f, L]Θ x,F ; S (abstract configuration) C ::= [f, L]Θ F ; S |A
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In order to facilitate proofs later, we append lifetime-related ghost informa-
tion to C, which does not directly affect the execution. A is a global lifetime
context, which is the lifetime context of all local lifetime variables from all stack
frames; we add a tag on a local lifetime variable (e.g. α(i) instead of α) to clar-
ify which stack frame it belongs to. Θ is a lifetime parameter context, which
maps the lifetime variables in the (local) lifetime context for a stack frame to
the corresponding tagged lifetime variables in the global lifetime context.
Just as concrete operational semantics, abstract operational semantics is
characterized by the one-step transition relation C →Π C′ and the termina-
tion relation finalΠ(C), which are defined by the following rules. C[vˆ/x] is C with
every x in its abstract stack frames replaced with vˆ. ‘val’ maps both 〈vˆ〉 and
〈vˆ,x◦〉 to vˆ.
SΠ,f,L = let y = mutborα x; gotoL
′ x◦ is fresh
[f, L]Θ F+{(x, 〈vˆ∗〉)}; S |A →Π [f, L′]Θ F+{(y, 〈vˆ∗,x◦〉), (x, 〈x◦〉)}; S |A
SΠ,f,L = let y = mutborα x; gotoL
′ x◦ is fresh
[f, L]Θ F+{(x, 〈vˆ∗,x′◦〉)}; S |A →Π [f, L′]Θ F+{(y, 〈vˆ∗,x◦〉), (x, 〈x◦,x′◦〉)}; S |A
SΠ,f,L = dropx; gotoL
′ TyΠ,f,L(x) = Pˇ T
[f, L]Θ F+{(x, vˆ)}; S |A →Π [f, L′]Θ F ; S |A
SΠ,f,L = dropx; gotoL
′ TyΠ,f,L(x) = mutα T
[f, L]Θ F+{(x, 〈vˆ∗,x◦〉)}; S |A →Π
(
[f, L′]Θ F ; S |A
)[
vˆ∗/x◦
]
SΠ,f,L = immutx; gotoL
′
[f, L]Θ F+{(x, 〈vˆ∗,x◦〉)}; S |A →Π
(
[f, L′]Θ F+{(x, 〈vˆ∗〉)}; S |A
)[
vˆ∗/x◦
]
SΠ,f,L = swap(∗x, ∗y); gotoL′ TyΠ,f,L(y) = ownT
[f, L]Θ F+{(x, 〈vˆ∗,x◦〉), (y, 〈wˆ∗〉)}; S |A
→Π [f, L′]Θ F+{(x, 〈wˆ∗,x◦〉), (y, 〈vˆ∗〉)}; S |A
SΠ,f,L = swap(∗x, ∗y); gotoL′ TyΠ,f,L(y) = mutα T
[f, L]Θ F+{(x, 〈vˆ∗,x◦〉), (y, 〈wˆ∗,y◦〉)}; S |A
→Π [f, L′]Θ F+{(x, 〈wˆ∗,x◦〉), (y, 〈vˆ∗,y◦〉)}; S |A
SΠ,f,L = let ∗y = x; gotoL′
[f, L]Θ F+{(x, vˆ)}; S |A →Π [f, L′]Θ F+{(y, 〈vˆ〉)}; S |A
SΠ,f,L = let y = ∗x; gotoL′ TyΠ,f,L(x) = ownP T
[f, L]Θ F+{(x, 〈vˆ∗〉)}; S |A →Π [f, L′]Θ F+{(y, vˆ∗)}; S |A
SΠ,f,L = let y = ∗x; gotoL′ TyΠ,f,L(x) = immutα P T
[f, L]Θ F+{(x, 〈vˆ∗〉)}; S |A →Π [f, L′]Θ F+{(y, 〈val(vˆ∗)〉)}; S |A
SΠ,f,L = let y = ∗x; gotoL′ TyΠ,f,L(x) = mutα ownT x◦∗ is fresh
[f, L]Θ F+{(x, 〈〈vˆ∗∗〉,x◦〉)}; S |A →Π
(
[f, L′]Θ F+{(y, 〈vˆ∗∗,x◦∗〉)}; S |A
)[〈x◦∗〉/x◦]
SΠ,f,L = let y = ∗x; gotoL′ TyΠ,f,L(x) = mutα immutβ T
[f, L]Θ F+{(x, 〈〈vˆ∗∗〉,x◦〉)}; S |A →Π
(
[f, L′]Θ F+{(y, 〈vˆ∗∗〉)}; S |A
)[〈vˆ∗∗〉/x◦]
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SΠ,f,L = let y = ∗x; gotoL′ TyΠ,f,L(x) = mutαmutβ T x∗◦ is fresh
[f, L]Θ F+{(x, 〈〈vˆ∗∗,x′∗◦〉,x◦〉)}; S |A
→Π
(
[f, L′]Θ F+{(y, 〈vˆ∗∗,x∗◦〉)}; S |A
)[〈x∗◦,x′∗◦〉/x◦]
SΠ,f,L = let ∗y = copy ∗x; gotoL′
[f, L]Θ F ; S |A →Π [f, L′]Θ F+{(y, 〈val(F(x))〉)}; S |A
SΠ,f,L = x as T ; gotoL
′
[f, L]Θ F ; S |A →Π [f, L′]Θ F ; S |A
SΠ,f,L = let y = g〈α0, . . . , αm−1〉(x0, . . . , xn−1); gotoL′
ΣΠ,g = 〈α′0, . . . , α′m−1 | · · ·〉 (x′0:T0, . . . , x′n−1:Tn−1) Θ′ = {(α′j , αjΘ) | j∈ [m]}
[f, L]Θ F+{(xi, vˆi) | i∈ [n]}; S |A →Π [g, entry]Θ′ {(x′i, vˆi) | i∈ [n]}; [f, L′]Θ y,F ; S |A
SΠ,f,L = returnx
[f, L]Θ {(x, vˆ)}; [g, L′]Θ′ x′,F ′; S |A →Π [g, L′]Θ′ F ′+{(x′, vˆ)}; S |A
SΠ,f,L = returnx
finalΠ
(
[f, L]Θ {(x, vˆ)} |A
)
SΠ,f,L = introα; gotoL
′ S has n layers Aex = {α(k)∈A | k<n}
[f, L]Θ F ; S |(A,R) →Π [f, L′]Θ+{(α,α(n))} F ; S |({α(n)}+A, {α(n)}×({α(n)}+Aex)+R)
SΠ,f,L = nowα; gotoL
′
[f, L]{(α,α(n))}+Θ F ; S |({α(n)}+A,R) →Π [f, L′]Θ F ; S |(A, {(β(k),γ(l))∈R | β(k) 6=α(n)})
SΠ,f,L = α ≤ β; gotoL′
[f, L]Θ F ; S |(A,R) →Π [f, L′]Θ F ; S |(A, ({(Θ(α),Θ(β))}+R)+)
SΠ,f,L = let ∗y = const ; gotoL′
[f, L]Θ F ; S |A →Π [f, L′]Θ F+{(y, 〈const〉)}; S |A
SΠ,f,L = let ∗y = ∗x op ∗x′; gotoL′
[f, L]Θ F ; S |A →Π [f, L′]Θ F+{(y, 〈val(F(x)) [[op]] val(F(x′))〉)}; S |A
SΠ,f,L = let ∗y = rand(); gotoL′
[f, L]Θ F ; S |A →Π [f, L′]Θ F+{(y, 〈n〉)}; S |A
SΠ,f,L = let ∗y = injT0+T1i ∗x; gotoL′
[f, L]Θ F+{(x, 〈vˆ∗〉)}; S |A →Π [f, L′]Θ F+{(y, 〈inji vˆ∗〉)}; S |A
SΠ,f,L = match ∗x {inj0 ∗y0 → gotoL′0, inj1 ∗y1 → gotoL′1}
TyΠ,f,L(x) = Pˇ (T0+T1)
[f, L]Θ F+{(x, 〈inji vˆ∗!〉)}; S |A →Π [f, L′i]Θ F+{(yi, 〈vˆ∗!〉)}; S |A
SΠ,f,L = match ∗x {inj0 ∗y0 → gotoL′0, inj1 ∗y1 → gotoL′1}
TyΠ,f,L(x) = mutα(T0+T1) x◦! is fresh
[f, L]Θ F+{(x, 〈inji vˆ∗!,x◦〉)}; S |A →Π
(
[f, L′i]Θ F+{(yi, 〈vˆ∗!,x◦!〉)}; S |A
)[
inji x◦!/x◦
]
SΠ,f,L = let ∗y = (∗x0, ∗x1); gotoL′
[f, L]Θ F+{(x0, 〈vˆ∗0〉), (x1, 〈vˆ∗1〉)}; S |A →Π [f, L′]Θ F+{(y, 〈(vˆ∗0, vˆ∗1)〉)}; S |A
SΠ,f,L = let (∗y0, ∗y1) = ∗x; gotoL′
[f, L]Θ F+{(x, 〈(vˆ∗0, vˆ∗1)〉)}; S |A →Π [f, L′]Θ F+{(y0, 〈vˆ∗0〉), (y1, 〈vˆ∗1〉)}; S |A
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SΠ,f,L = let (∗y0, ∗y1) = ∗x; gotoL′ x◦0,x◦1 are fresh
[f, L]Θ F+{(x, 〈(vˆ∗0, vˆ∗1),x◦〉)}; S |A
→Π
(
[f, L′]Θ F+{(y0, 〈vˆ∗0,x◦0〉), (y1, 〈vˆ∗1,x◦1〉)}; S |A
)[
(x◦0,x◦1)/x◦
]
Example 6 (Execution on Abstract Operaitonal Semantics). The following is an
example execution on abstract operational semantics for Example 1. It corre-
sponds to Example 5, the example execution on concrete operational semantics.
Here, A := ({α}, Id{α}) and Θ := {α, α(0)}.
[inc-max, entry]∅ {(oa, 〈4〉), (ob, 〈3〉)} |(∅,∅)
→ [inc-max, L1]Θ {(oa, 〈4〉), (ob, 〈3〉)} |A
→+ [inc-max, L3]Θ {(ma, 〈4,a◦〉), (mb, 〈3, b◦〉), (oa, 〈a◦〉), (ob, 〈b◦〉)} |A
→ [take-max, entry]Θ {(ma, 〈4,a◦〉), (mb, 〈3, b◦〉)};
[inc-max, L4]Θ mc, {(oa, 〈a◦〉), (ob, 〈b◦〉)} |A
→ [take-max, L1]Θ {(ord , 〈inj1 ()〉), (ma, 〈4,a◦〉), (mb, 〈3, b◦〉)};
[inc-max, L4]Θ mc, {(oa, 〈a◦〉), (ob, 〈b◦〉)} |A
→ [take-max, L2]Θ {(ou, 〈()〉), (ma, 〈4,a◦〉), (mb, 〈3, b◦〉)};
[inc-max, L4]Θ mc, {(oa, 〈a◦〉), (ob, 〈b◦〉)} |A
→+ [take-max, L4]Θ {(ma, 〈4,a◦〉)};
[inc-max, L4]Θ mc, {(oa, 〈a◦〉), (ob, 〈3〉)} |A
→ [inc-max, L4]Θ {(mc, 〈4,a◦〉), (oa, 〈a◦〉), (ob, 〈3〉)} |A
→ [inc-max, L5]Θ {(o1 , 〈1〉), (mc, 〈4,a◦〉), (oa, 〈a◦〉), (ob, 〈3〉)} |A
→+ [inc-max, L7]Θ {(oc′, 〈5〉), (mc, 〈4,a◦〉), (oa, 〈a◦〉), (ob, 〈3〉)} |A
→ [inc-max, L8]Θ {(oc′, 〈4〉), (mc, 〈5,a◦〉), (oa, 〈a◦〉), (ob, 〈3〉)} |A
→+ [inc-max, L10]Θ {(oa, 〈5〉), (ob, 〈3〉)} |A
→ [inc-max, L11]∅ {(oa, 〈5〉), (ob, 〈3〉)} |(∅,∅)
→+ [inc-max, L14]∅ {(or , 〈inj1 ()〉)} |(∅,∅)
The abstract variables a◦ and b◦ are introduced for mutable borrow of oa and
ob. By the call of take-max, mb is released, whereby the variable b◦ is set to the
value 3, and the variable a◦ is passed to mc. After the increment is performed,
mc is released, and thereby a◦ is set to the updated value 5.
C.2 Safety on Abstract Configurations
It is natural to require for an abstract configuration that each variable is shared
by the borrower and the lender and is not used elsewhere.31 A stack of borrows
(caused by reborrows) can be described as a chain of abstract variables (e.g.
〈v,x〉, 〈x,y〉, 〈y〉).
To describe such restrictions, we define the safety on an abstract configura-
tion ‘safeΠ(C)’. We also show progression and preservation regarding safety on
abstract operational semantics, as a part of soundness of COR’s type system.
31 We should take care of the cases where a mutable reference is immutably borrowed
(e.g. immutαmutβ T ), because immutable references can be unrestrictedly copied.
Later when we define ‘summary‘ judgments, we get over this problem using access
modes.
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Summary. An abstract variable summary X is a finite multiset of items of form
‘giveα(x :: T )’ or ‘take
α(x :: T )’.
Now, ‘summaryaD(vˆ :: T | X )’ (the pre-value vˆ of type T yields an abstract
variable summary X , under the access mode D and the activeness a) is defined
as follows. Here, an access mode D is either of form ‘hot’ or ‘cold’.
summary†αD (x :: T | {takeα(x :: T )})
summaryaD·Pˇ (vˆ :: T | X )
summaryaD(〈vˆ〉 :: Pˇ T | X )
D · own := D D · immutβ := cold
summaryahot(vˆ :: T | X )
summaryahot(〈vˆ,x〉 :: mutβ T | X ⊕ {giveβ(x :: T )})
summaryacold(vˆ :: T | X )
summaryacold(〈vˆ, wˆ〉 :: mutβ T | X )
summaryaD(vˆ :: T [µX.T/X] | X )
summaryaD(vˆ :: µX.T/X | X )
summaryaD(const :: T | ∅)
summaryaD(vˆ :: Ti | X )
summaryaD
(
inji vˆ :: T0+T1
∣∣ X ) summaryaD(vˆ0 :: T0 | X0) summaryaD(vˆ1 :: T1 | X1)summaryaD((vˆ0, vˆ1) :: T0×T1 ∣∣ X0 ⊕X1)
‘summaryΘ(F :: Γ | X )’ (the abstract stack frame F respecting the variable
context Γ yields X , under the lifetime parameter context Θ) is defined as follows.
dom F = dom Γ for any x:a T ∈ Γ, summaryahot
(F(x) :: T Θ | Xx)
summaryΘ
(F :: Γ ∣∣ ⊕x:aT∈Γ Xx)
Finally, ‘summaryΠ(C | X )’ (the abstract configuration C yields X under the
program Π) is defined as follows.
for any i ∈ [n+ 1], summaryΘi(Fi :: ΓΠ,fi,Li | Xi)
summaryΠ
(
[f0, L0]Θ0 F0; [f1, L1]Θ1 x1,F1; · · · ; [fn, Ln]Θn xn,Fn |A
∣∣ ⊕n
i=0Xi
)
Lifetime Safety. ‘lifetimeSafei(Aglobal,Θ | Alocal, Aex)’ (the global lifetime
context Aglobal with the lifetime parameter context Θ is safe on lifetimes with
respect to the (local) lifetime context Alocal from the type system and the set of
lifetime parameters Aex under the stack frame index i) is defined as follows.
dom Θ = |Alocal| for any α∈Aex, letting β(k) = Θ(α), k < i holds
for any α∈|Alocal|−Aex, Θ(α) = α(i)
for any (α, β)∈|Alocal|2−A2ex, α≤Alocal β ⇐⇒ Θ(α)≤Aglobal Θ(β)
for any α, β∈A2ex, α≤Alocal β =⇒ Θ(α)≤Aglobal Θ(β)
lifetimeSafei(Aglobal,Θ | Alocal, Aex)
‘lifetimeSafeΠ
(
Aglobal, (fi, Li,Θi)
n
i=0
)
’ (Aglobal with the finite sequence of
function names, labels and lifetime parameter contexts (fi, Li,Θi)
n
i=0 is safe on
lifetimes under the program Π) is defined as follows.
for any i∈ [n+1], lifetimeSafei(Aglobal,Θi | AΠ,fi,Li , AexΠ,fi)
card |Aglobal| =
∑n
i=0 card (|AΠ,fi,Li |−AexΠ,fi)
lifetimeSafeΠ
(
Aglobal, (fi, Li,Θi)ni=0
)
AΠ,f,L: the lifetime context for the label L of f in Π cardX: the cardinality of X
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Finally, ‘lifetimeSafeΠ(C)’ (the abstract configuration C is safe on lifetimes
under the program Π) is defined as follows.
lifetimeSafeΠ
(
Aglobal, (fi, Li,Θi)
n
i=0
)
lifetimeSafeΠ
(
[fn, Ln]Θn Fn; [fn−1, Ln−1]Θn−1 xn−1,Fn−1; · · · ; [f0, L0]Θ0 x0,F0 |Aglobal
)
Safety. We first define the safety on abstract variable summaries. ‘safeA(x,X )’
is defined as follows. Here, T ∼A U means T ≤A U ∧ U ≤A T (the type
equivalence).
X (x) = {|giveα(x :: T ), takeβ(x :: T ′)|} T ∼A T ′ α ≤A β
safeA(x,X )
X (x) = ∅
safeA(x,X )
X (x): the multiset of the items of form ‘giveγ(x :: U)’/‘takeγ(x :: U)’ in X
‘safeA(X )’ means that safeA(x,X ) holds for any x.
Finally, ‘safeΠ(C)’ is defined as follows.
summaryΠ(C | X ) lifetimeSafeΠ(C) C = · · · |A safeA(X )
safeΠ(C)
Property 1 (Safety on an Abstract Configuration Ensures Progression). For any
Π and C such that safeΠ(C) holds and finalΠ(C) does not hold, there exists C′
satisfying C →Π C′.
Proof. Clear. The important guarantee the safety on an abstract configuration
provides is that, in the pre-value assigned to each active variable, abstract vari-
ables do not appear except in the form 〈vˆ,x〉. uunionsq
Lemma 1 (Safety on the Abstract Configuration is Preserved). For any
Π and C, C′ such that safeΠ(C) and C →Π C′ hold, safeΠ(C′) is satisfied.
Proof. Straightforward. Preservation of safety on the abstract variable summary
is the point. Below we check some tricky cases.
Type Weakening. Type weakening (x as T ) essentially only changes lifetimes on
types. A lifetime on a type can become earlier if it is not guarded by any mutα.
Thus only the following changes happen on the abstract variable summary: (i)
for an item of form ‘giveα(x :: T )’, α can get earlier and T can be weakened; and
(ii) for an item of form ‘takeα(x :: T )’, α do not change and T can be weakened.
Mutable (Re)borrow. When we perform letmy = mutborα px , the abstract vari-
able summary just gets two new items ‘giveα(x◦ :: T )’ and ‘take
α(x◦ :: T )’, for
some x◦ and T .
Release of a Mutable Reference. When we release a mutable reference mx , whose
pre-value is of form 〈vˆ,x◦〉, only the following changes happen on the abstract
variable summary: (i) the items of form ‘giveα(x◦ :: T )’ and ‘take
β(x◦ :: T ′)’ are
removed; and (ii) since vˆ moves to another variable, the type of each abstract
variable in vˆ may change into an equivalent type.
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Ownership Weakening. Similar to a release of a mutable reference.
Swap. Swap (swap(∗x, ∗y)) actually does not alter the abstract variable sum-
mary.
Copying. When data of type T is copied, T : copy holds, which ensures that
each mutable reference mutα U in T is guarded by some immutable reference.
Therefore the abstract variable summary does not change.
Subdivision of a Mutable Reference. A mutable reference is subdivided in the
following forms: pair destruction ‘let (∗mx 0, ∗mx 1) = ∗mx ’, variant destruction
‘match ∗mx {inj0 ∗my→gotoL0, · · ·}’, and dereference ‘letmx = ∗mpx ’. When
a mutable reference mx with a pre-value 〈vˆ,x〉 is subdivided, the two items of
form giveα(x :: T ) and take
β(x :: T ′) are accordingly ‘subdivided’ in the abstract
variable summary. With a close look, the safety turns out to be preserved.
Elimination of a Local Lifetime Variable. Just after we eliminate a local life-
time variable α (‘nowα’), since there remains no lifetime variable earlier than
α in the lifetime context, the abstract variable summary has no item of form
‘giveα(n)(x :: T )’ (for appropriate n). Therefore, just before (and just after)
the lifetime elimination, the abstract variable summary has no item of form
‘takeα
(n)
(x :: T ′)’. uunionsq
C.3 SLDC Resolution
For CHC representation of a COR program, we introduce a variant of SLD resolu-
tion, which we call SLDC resolution (Selective Linear Definite clause Calculative
resolution). Interpreting each CHC as a deduction rule, SLDC resolution can be
understood as a top-down construction of a proof tree from the left-hand side.
SLDC resolution is designed to be complete with respect to the logic (Lemma 2).
A resolutive configuration K and a pre-resolutive configuration Kˆ have the
following form.
(resolutive configuration) K ::= ϕˇ0, . . . , ϕˇn−1 | q
(pre-resolutive configuration) Kˆ ::= ϕ0, . . . , ϕn−1 | q
The elementary formulas in a resolutive configuration can be understood as a
model of a call stack. q is a pattern that represents the returned value. This idea
is later formalized in Appendix C.4.
K →(Φ,Ξ) K′ (K can change into K′ by one step of SLDC resolution on
(Φ,Ξ)) is defined by the following non-deterministic transformation from K to
K′.
1. The ‘stack’ part of K should be non-empty. Let K = f(p0, . . . , pm−1), ϕˇ1, . . . ,
ϕˇn | q.
Take from Φ any CHC that unifies with the head of the stack of K. That
is, Φ is of form ∀x0:σ0, . . . , xl−1:σl−1. f(p′0, . . . , p′m−1) ⇐= ψ0 ∧ · · · ∧
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ψk−1 and p′0, . . . , p
′
m−1 unify with p0, . . . , pm−1. Let us take the most general
unifier (θ, θ′) such that p0θ = p′0θ
′, . . . , pm−1θ = p′m−1θ
′ hold. Here, θ maps
variables to patterns.
Now we have a pre-resolutive configuration Kˆ = ψ′0, . . . , ψ′k−1, ϕˇ′1, . . . , ϕˇ′n | q′,
where ψ′i := ψiθ
′, ϕˇ′j := ϕˇjθ and q
′ := qθ.
2. We ‘calculate’ Kˆ into a resolutive configuration. That is, we repeat the fol-
lowing operations to update (Kˆ until ψ′0, . . . , ψ′k−1 all become elementary.
K′ is set to the final version of Kˆ.
– We substitute variables conservatively until there do not remain terms
of form ∗x, ◦x, x.i, x op t/t op x; for each case, we replace x with
〈x∗〉/〈x∗, x◦〉 (depending on the sort), 〈x∗, x◦〉, (x0, x1), n, taking fresh
variables.
– We replace each ∗〈t∗〉/∗〈t∗, t◦〉, ◦〈t∗, t◦〉, (t0, t1).i, n op n′ with t∗, t◦, ti,
n [[op]]n′.
– If there exists a variable x that occurs only once in the pre-resolutive
configuration Kˆ, then replace it with any value of the suitable sort.32
We have carefully designed SLDC resolution to match it with abstract opera-
tional semantics, which assists the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 2 (Completeness of SLDC Resolution). For any (Φ,Ξ) and f ∈
dom Ξ, the following are equivalent for any values v0, . . . , vn−1, w of the appro-
priate sorts.
1. Mleast(Φ,Ξ)(f)(v0, . . . , vn−1, w) holds.
2. There exists a sequence K0, . . . ,KN such that K0 = f(v0, . . . , vn−1, r) | r,
KN = | p, K0 →(Φ,Ξ) · · · →(Φ,Ξ) KN and p can be refined into w by instan-
tiating variables.
Proof. Clear by thinking of derivation trees (which can be defined in a natural
manner) on CHC system (Φ,Ξ). uunionsq
C.4 Equivalence of the AOS-based Model and the CHC
Representation
We first show a bisimulation between abstract operational semantics and SLDC
resolution (Lemma 3). Using the bisimulation, we can easily show the equivalence
of the AOS-based model and (the least model of) the CHC representation.
Bisimulation Lemma. Interestingly, there is a bisimulation between the tran-
sition system of abstract operational semantics and the process of SLDC resolu-
tion.
F  θf,L,r ϕˇ (the abstract stack frame F can be translated into the elementary
formula ϕˇ, under θ, f , L and r) is defined as follows. Here, θ maps abstract
32 We use this peculiar rule to handle the ‘let ∗y = rand()’ instruction later for Lemma 3.
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variables to (normal) variables. vˆθ is the value made from vˆ by replacing each x
with θ(x). r is the abstract variable for taking the result.
the items of F are enumerated as (x0, vˆ0), . . . , (xn−1, vˆn−1)
F  θf,L,r fL(vˆ0θ0, . . . , vˆn−1θ, rθ)
Now, C  Π K is defined as follows.
safeΠ(C) C = [f0, L0]Θ0 F0; [f1, L1]Θ1 x1,F1; · · · ; [fn, Ln]Θn xn,Fn |A
r0, . . . , rn are fresh in C
F0  θf0,L0,r0 ϕˇ0 for any i∈ [n], Fi+1+{(xi+1, ri)} θfi+1,Li+1,ri+1 ϕˇi+1
C  Π ϕˇ0, . . . , ϕˇn | θ(rn)
Lemma 3 (Bisimulation between Abstract Operational Semantics and
SLDC Resolution). Take any Π, C and K satisfying C  Π K.
For any C′ satisfying C →Π C′, there exists some K′ satisfying K →(|Π|) K′
and C′  Π K′. Likewise, for any K′ satisfying K →(|Π|) K′, there exists some C′
satisfying C →Π C′ and C′  Π K′.
Proof. Straightforward. uunionsq
AOS-based Model and the Equivalence Theorem. Take any Π and simple
f . The AOS-based model (AOS stands for abstract operational semantics) for f ,
denoted by fAOS, is the predicate defined by the following rule.
C0 →Π · · · →Π CN finalΠ(CN ) safeΠ(C0)
C0 = [f, entry]∅ {(xi, vi) | i∈ [n]} |(∅,∅) CN = [f, L′]∅ {(y, w)} |(∅,∅)
fAOSΠ (v0, . . . , vn−1, w)
Now we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Equivalence of the AOS-based Model and the CHC Rep-
resentation). For any Π and simple f in Π, fAOSΠ is equivalent to M(|Π|)(fentry).
Proof. Clear from completeness of SLDC resolution (Lemma 2) and the bisimu-
lation between abstract operational semantics and SLDC resolution (Lemma 3).
uunionsq
C.5 Bisimulation between Concrete and Abstract Operational
Semantics
Extending ‘safeH(F :: Γ | F)’ introduced in § 3.3, we define the safe readout
‘safeΠ(C | C)’ of an abstract configuration from a concrete configuration. In-
terestingly, the safe readout is a bisimulation between concrete and abstract
operational semantics (Lemma 5). We also establish progression and preserva-
tion regarding the safe readout, as a part of soundness of COR’s type system
in terms of concrete operational semantics, extending the soundness shown for
abstract operational semantics in Appendix C.2.
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Auxiliary Notions. An extended abstract variable summary Xˆ is a finite mul-
tiset of items of form ‘giveα(∗a;x :: T )’ or ‘takeα(∗a;x :: T )’, where a is an ad-
dress. An extended access mode Dˆ is of form either ‘hot’ or ‘coldα’. An extended
memory footprint Mˆ is a finite multiset of items of form ‘hota(a)’ or ‘coldα(a)’,
where a is an address.
Readout. First, ‘readouta
H,Dˆ
(a :: T | vˆ; Xˆ ,Mˆ)’ and ‘readouta
H,Dˆ
(∗a :: T | vˆ; Xˆ ,Mˆ)’
(the pointer of the address a / the data at a, typed T , can be read out from the
heap H as a pre-value vˆ, yielding an extended abstract variable summary Xˆ and
an extended memory footprint Mˆ, under the extended access mode Dˆ and the
activeness a) are defined by the following rules.
readoutaH,Dˆ◦Pˇ (∗a :: T | vˆ; Xˆ ,Mˆ)
readouta
H,Dˆ
(
a :: Pˇ T
∣∣ 〈vˆ〉; Xˆ ,Mˆ)
Dˆ ◦ own := Dˆ hot ◦ immutβ := coldβ coldα ◦ immutβ := coldα
readoutaH,hot(∗a :: T | vˆ; Xˆ ,Mˆ)
readoutaH,hot
(
a :: mutβ T
∣∣ 〈vˆ,x〉; Xˆ ⊕{|giveβ(∗a;x :: T )|}, Mˆ)
readoutaH,coldβ (∗a :: T | vˆ; Xˆ ,Mˆ)
readoutaH,coldβ
(
a :: mutβ T
∣∣ 〈vˆ, wˆ〉; Xˆ ,Mˆ)
readout†α
H,Dˆ
(∗a :: T | x; {|takeα(∗a;x :: T )|},∅)
H(a) = a′ readouta
H,Dˆ
(a′ :: P T | vˆ; Xˆ ,Mˆ)
readouta
H,Dˆ
(∗a :: P T | vˆ; Xˆ ,Mˆ⊕{|Dˆa(a)|})
Dˆa(a) :=
{
hota(a) (Dˆ = hot)
coldβ(a) (Dˆ = coldβ)
readouta
H,Dˆ
(∗a :: T [µX.T/X] | vˆ; Xˆ ,Mˆ)
readouta
H,Dˆ
(∗a :: µX.T | vˆ; Xˆ ,Mˆ)
H(a) = n
readouta
H,Dˆ
(∗a :: int | n; ∅, {|Dˆa(a)|}) readout
a
H,Dˆ(∗a :: unit | (); ∅,∅)
H(a) = i ∈ [2] readoutaH,Dˆ(∗(a+1) :: Ti | vˆ; Xˆ ,Mˆ) n0 = (#T1−i−#Ti)≥0
for any k ∈ [n0], H(a+1+#Ti+k) = 0 Mˆ0 = {|Dˆa(a+1+#Ti+k) | k ∈ [n0]|}
readoutaH,Dˆ
(∗a :: T0+T1 ∣∣ inji vˆ; Xˆ ,Mˆ⊕{|Dˆa(a)|}⊕Mˆ0)
readouta
H,Dˆ
(∗a :: T0 ∣∣ vˆ0; Xˆ0,Mˆ0) readoutaH,Dˆ(∗(a+ #T0) :: T1 ∣∣ vˆ1; Xˆ1,Mˆ1)
readouta
H,Dˆ
(∗a :: T0×T1 ∣∣ (vˆ0, vˆ1); Xˆ0⊕Xˆ1, Mˆ0⊕Mˆ1)
Next, ‘readoutH,Θ(F :: Γ | F ; Xˆ ,Mˆ)’ (the stack frame F respecting the vari-
able context Γ can be read out from H as an abstract stack frame F , yielding
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Xˆ and Mˆ, under the lifetime parameter context Θ) is defined as follows.
dom F = dom Γ for any x:a T ∈ Γ, readoutaH,hot(F(x) :: TΘ | vˆx; Xˆx,Mˆx)
readoutH,Θ
(
F :: Γ
∣∣ {(x, vˆx) | x ∈ dom Γ}; ⊕x∈dom Γ Xˆx, ⊕x∈dom Γ Mˆx)
Finally, ‘readoutΠ(C | C; Xˆ ,Mˆ)’ (the data of the concrete configuration C
can be read out as the abstract configuration C, yielding Xˆ and Mˆ, under the
program Π) is defined as follows.
for any i ∈ [n+1], readoutH,Θi(Fi :: ΓΠ,fi,Li | Fi; Xˆi,Mˆi)
readoutΠ
(
[f0, L0] F0; [f1, L1]x1,F1; · · · ; [fn, Ln]xn,Fn | H∣∣ [f0, L0]Θ0 F0; [f1, L1]Θ1 x1,F1; · · · ; [fn, Ln]Θn xn,Fn |A; ⊕ni=0 Xˆi,⊕ni=0 Mˆi )
Safety. We define the safety on extended abstract variable summaries and ex-
tended memory footprints.
‘safeA(x, Xˆ )’ is defined as follows.
Xˆ (x) = {|giveα(∗a;x :: T ), takeβ(∗a;x :: T ′)|} T ∼A T ′ α ≤A β
safeA(x, Xˆ )
Xˆ (x) = ∅
safeA(x, Xˆ )
Xˆ (x): the multiset of items of form ‘giveγ(∗b;x :: U)’/‘takeγ(∗b;x :: U)’ in Xˆ
‘safeA(Xˆ )’ means that safeA(x, Xˆ ) holds for any x.
‘safeA(a,Mˆ)’ is defined as follows.
Mˆ(a) = {hota(a)}
safeA(a,Mˆ)
Mˆ(a) = ∅
safeA(a,Mˆ)
Mˆ(a) = {|hot†α(a), coldβ0(a), . . . , coldβn−1(a)|} for any i ∈ [n], βi ≤A α
safeA(a,Mˆ)
Mˆ(a): the multiset of items of form hota(a)/coldα(a) in Mˆ
‘safeA(Mˆ)’ means that safeA(a,Mˆ) holds for any address a.
Safe Readout. Finally, ‘safeΠ(C | C)’ (the data of the concrete configuration
C can be safely read out as the abstract configuration C under Π) is defined as
follows.
readoutΠ(C | C; Xˆ ,Mˆ) lifetimeSafeΠ(C) C = · · · |A safeA(Xˆ ) safeA(Mˆ)
safeΠ(C | C)
‘safeΠ(C)’ means that safeΠ(C | C) holds for some C.
Property 2 (Safety on a Concrete Configuration Ensures Progression). For any
Π and C such that safeΠ(C) holds and finalΠ(C) does not hold, there exists
some C′ satisfying C→Π C′.
Proof. Clear. One important guarantee the safety provides is that the data is
stored in the heap in an expected form. uunionsq
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Lemma 4 (Safe Readout Ensures Safety on the Abstract Configura-
tion). For Π, C and C such that safeΠ(C | C) holds, safeΠ(C) holds.
Proof. By straightforward induction over the judgment deduction. Note that
safety on a extended abstract variable summary is in fact an extension of safety
on an abstract variable summary. uunionsq
Bisimulation Lemma. The safe readout defined above is actually a bisimula-
tion between concrete and abstract operational semantics.
Lemma 5 (Bisimulation between Concrete and Abstract Operational
Semantics). Take any Π, C and C satisfying safeΠ(C | C).
For any C′ satisfying C →Π C′, there exists C′ satisfying C →Π C′ and
safeΠ(C
′ | C′). Likewise, for any C′ satisfying C →Π C′ holds, there exists C′
satisfying C→Π C′ and safeΠ(C′ | C′).
Proof. How to take C′ according to C′ and vice versa can be decided in a straight-
forward way that we do not explicitly describe here. The property safeΠ(C
′ | C′)
can be justified by the following observations.
No Unexpected Changes on Unrelated Data. The safety on the extended memory
footprint ensures that operations on hotly accessed data do not affect unrelated
data. Here, the following property plays a role: when readoutH,hot(a :: P T |
vˆ; Xˆ ,Mˆ) holds and P is of form own or mutα, {|hot(a+ k) | k ∈ [#T ]|} ⊆ Mˆ
holds.
Preservation of the Safety on the Extended Abstract Variable Summary. It can
be shown in a similar way to the proof of Lemma 1.
Preservation of Safety on the Extended Memory Footprint. It can be shown by
straightforward case analysis.
One important point is that, on lifetime elimination (nowα), a frozen hot
access (hot†α(a)) can be safely made active (hotactive(a)), because there are no
cold accesses on a, which is guaranteed by the type system.
Another point is that swap (swap(∗x, ∗y)) does not change the extended
memory footprint. uunionsq
Property 3 (Safety on the Concrete Configuration is Preserved). For any Π and
C,C′ such that safeΠ(C) and C→Π C′ hold, safeΠ(C′) is satisfied.
Proof. It immediately follows by Lemma 5. uunionsq
C.6 Equivalence of the COS-based and AOS-based Models
After introducing some easy lemmas, we prove the equivalence of the COS-
based and AOS-based models (Theorem 3), relying on the bisimulation lemma
Lemma 5 proved above. Finally, we achieve the complete proof of Theorem 1.
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Lemma 6. Take any Π, simple f and L. For any F, H and F , the following
equivalence holds, if L = entry or the statement at L is of form returnx.
safeH(F :: ΓΠ,f,L | F) ⇐⇒ safeΠ
(
[f, L] F | H ∣∣ [f, L]∅ F |(∅,∅) )
(The safeH judgment is defined in § 3.3.)
Proof. By straightforward induction. uunionsq
Lemma 7. For any Π and C of form [f, L] F | H, when f is simple, there is
at most one C satisfying safeΠ(C | C).
Proof. By straightforward induction. The simpleness of f has made the situation
easy, because abstract variables do not occur in C. uunionsq
Lemma 8. For any Π and C of form [f, L]∅ F |(∅,∅), when f is simple and C
is safe, there exists C satisfying safeΠ(C | C).
Proof. By straightforward construction. uunionsq
Theorem 3 (Equivalence of the COS-based Model and the AOS-based
Model). For any Π and simple f , fCOSΠ is equivalent to f
AOS
Π .
Proof. Let us show that
fCOSΠ (v0, . . . , vn−1, w) ⇐⇒ fAOSΠ (v0, . . . , vn−1, w)
holds for any values v0, . . . , vn−1, w of the sorts (|T0|), . . . , (|Tn−1|), (|U |), where
ΣΠ,f = (x0:T0, . . . , xn−1:Tn−1)→ U .
(=⇒). By assumption, we can take concrete configurations C0, . . . ,CN satisfy-
ing the following (for some L, y, F, H, F′ and H′).
C0 →Π · · · →Π CN finalΠ(CN )
C0 = [f, entry] F | H CN = [f, L] F′ | H′
safeH
(
F :: ΓΠ,f,entry
∣∣ {(xi, vi) | i∈ [n]}) safeH′(F′ :: ΓΠ,f,L ∣∣ {(y, w)})
By Lemma 6, taking abstract configurations
C0 := [f, entry]∅ {(xi, vi) | i∈ [n]} |(∅,∅) C′N := [f, L]∅ {(y, w)} |(∅,∅),
we have safeΠ(C0 | C0) and safeΠ(CN | C′N ). By Lemma 4, safeΠ(C0) also holds.
By Lemma 5, we can take C1, . . . , CN satisfying C0 →Π · · · →Π CN , finalΠ(CN ),
and safeΠ(Ck+1 | Ck+1) (for any k∈ [N ]).
Since safeΠ(CN | CN ) and safeΠ(CN | C′N ) hold, by Lemma 7 we have
CN = C′N . Therefore, fAOSΠ (v0, . . . , vn−1, w) holds.
(⇐=). By assumption, we can take abstract configurations C0, . . . , CN satisfying
the following (for some L and y).
C0 →Π · · · →Π CN finalΠ(CN )
C0 = [f, entry]∅ {(xi, vi) | i∈ [n]} |(∅,∅) CN = [f, L]∅ {(y, w)} |(∅,∅)
By Lemma 8, there exists C0 such that safeΠ(C0 | C0) holds. By Lemma 5,
we can take C1, . . . ,CN satisfying C0 →Π · · · →Π CN , finalΠ(CN ), and
safeΠ(Ck+1 | Ck+1) (for any k∈ [N ]).
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C0 and CN have form
C0 = [f, entry] F | H CN = [f, L] F′ | H′,
and by Lemma 6 the following judgments hold.
safeH
(
F :: ΓΠ,f,entry
∣∣ {(xi, vi) | i∈ [n]}) safeH′(F′ :: ΓΠ,f,L ∣∣ {(y, w)})
Therefore, fCOSΠ (v0, . . . , vn−1, w) holds. uunionsq
Combining the equivalences of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, we finally achieve
the proof of Theorem 1.
